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Abstract
Envy stems from a frustrating upward comparison and leads to diverse affective changes,
cognitions, and behavioral tendencies aimed at leveling the status difference between the
envier and the envied person. Benign envy increases efforts to improve the envier’s status
whereas malicious envy increases efforts to harm the envied person’s position. Despite its
importance, the elicitation of envy is still poorly understood. To address this void, I propose
a model for the elicitation of envy in which appraisals of personal control over reaching the
envied person’s status-yielding standard and deservingness of the advantage coordinate envy’s
diverse components—a conceptualization of benign and malicious envy as a social-functional
emotion syndromes. Dispositional and situational determinants that affect the appraisal di-
mensions should therefore elicit either benign or malicious envy. In line with this prediction,
Chapter 2 demonstrates that different forms of achievement motivation modulate envy, which
is in line with the notion that they are theoretically linked to appraisals of personal control.
Hope for success relates to dispositional benign envy, while the latter correlates with increased
performance in long-distance runners. In contrast, fear of failure relates to dispositional ma-
licious envy, while the latter is associated with the avoidance of a time goal. Furthermore,
Chapter 3 demonstrates that superior individuals’ pride displays modulate envy by conveying
affective and inferential information to observers, which is in line with the notion that they
are theoretically linked to appraisals of deservingness and personal control. Authentic pride
displays are likable and convey status in the form of prestige, increasing benignly envious
inclinations and behavior. Hubristic pride displays are less likable and convey status in the
form of dominance, increasing maliciously envious inclinations and behavior. Collectively,
the evidence supports the model of the elicitation of envy. Based on this conceptualization,
I highlight future research opportunities regarding the coordination of envy’s investigated as
well as neglected components and how this approach informs emotion research in general.
Keywords: benign and malicious envy, emotion elicitation, emotion syndrome, achieve-
ment motivation, authentic and hubristic pride

IX
Deutsche Kurzzusammenfassung
Neid entsteht durch einen frustrierenden Aufwärtsvergleich und führt zu diversen affek-
tiven Veränderungen, Kognitionen und Verhaltenstendenzen, die darauf abzielen, den Status-
unterschied zwischen dem Neider und der beneideten Person zu verringern. Gutartiger Neid
erhöht Anstrengungen, den Status des Neiders zu verbessern, wohingegen bösartiger Neid An-
strengungen erhöht die Stellung der beneideten Person zu schädigen. Trotz ihrer Wichtigkeit
ist die Auslösung von Neid noch wenig verstanden. Um diese Lücke zu schließen, schlage ich
ein Modell der Auslösung von Neid vor, in dem Evaluationen der persönlichen Kontrolle über
die Erlangung des status-einbringenden Standards der beneideten Person und der Verdient-
heit des Vorteils die diversen Komponenten von Neid koordinieren—eine Konzeptualisierung
von gutartigem und bösartigem Neid als sozial-funktionale Emotionssyndrome. Dispositiona-
le und situative Determinanten, die die Evaluationen beeinflussen, sollten folglich entweder
gutartigen oder bösartigen Neid auslösen. Im Einklang mit dieser Vorhersage demonstriert
Kapitel 2, dass verschiedene Formen von Leistungsmotivation Neid modulieren, was mit dem
Gedanken im Einklang ist, dass sie auf theoretischer Ebene mit der Evaluation der persönli-
chen Kontrolle zusammenhängen. Hoffnung auf Erfolg steht in Beziehung mit dispositional
gutartigem Neid, wohingegen letzterer mit erhöhter Performanz von Langläufern korreliert
ist. Im Gegensatz dazu steht Angst vor Misserfolg in Beziehung mit dispositional bösartigem
Neid, wohingegen letzterer mit der Vermeidung eines Zeitziels assoziiert ist. Weiterhin de-
monstriert Kapitel 3, dass der Stolzausdruck überlegener Personen den Neid von Beobachtern
durch vermittelte affektive und schlussfolgernde Informationen moduliert, was mit dem Ge-
danken im Einklang ist, dass er auf theoretischer Ebene mit Evaluationen der Verdientheit
und persönlichen Kontrolle zusammenhängt. Ausdruck von authentischem Stolz wirkt sym-
pathisch und vermittelt Status in der Form von Prestige, was gutartige Neidabsichten und Ver-
haltensweisen erhöht. Ausdruck von hybristischem Stolz wirkt unsympathisch und vermittelt
Status in der Form von Dominanz, was bösartige Neidabsichten und Verhaltensweisen erhöht.
Zusammengenommen unterstützt die Evidenz das Modell zur Auslösung von Neid. Basierend
auf dieser Konzeptualisierung hebe ich Möglichkeiten für zukünftige Forschung bezüglich der
Koordination von untersuchten als auch vernachlässigten Komponenten von Neid hervor und
auch wie dieser Ansatz zur Emotionsforschung allgemein beitragen kann.
Schlagwörter: gutartiger und bösartiger Neid, Emotionsauslösung, Emotionssyndrom, Leis-
tungsmotivation, authentischer und hybristischer Stolz
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1. Chapter 1 – Introduction
„Worth begets in base minds, envy; in great souls, emulation.“
Henry Fielding
„That some are poorer than others, ever was and ever will be: And that many are naturally
querulous and envious, is an Evil as old as the World.“
William Petty
Scholars and the public alike widely regard it as a matter of fact that envy is based on
agonizing inferiority and pure evil. Purportedly, envy arises in weak, ill-minded individu-
als and gives rise to severe repercussions. In biblical writings, envy motivated Cain to slay
his brother and caused the Romans to torture and eventually crucify Jesus (Aquaro, 2004).
Moreover, the noble cherub who began to burst with pride and to desire God’s advantages
transformed into the incarnation of evil—Lucifer—ultimately prompting his fall from heaven
(Rhodes, 2015). Furthermore, historians suppose that Adolf Hitler loathed the successes of
Jews, which ultimately fueled his desire to expel and systematically murder them (Smith,
2014). Complementarily, envy is also said to be crucially incited by structural properties of
societal systems (Schoeck, 1969). In dictatorships, the destiny of a country is determined by
a single, powerful person. This concentration of status and influence presumably fosters envy,
thereby leading to revolutions such as the disempowerment of Khrushchev. In addition, even
communist systems, which aim at actively preventing envy by establishing equality, allegedly
foster strong begrudging responses to unavoidable small differences between humans. Car-
ried to the extreme, the envy inherent in political systems is sometimes used to characterize
society as a whole, as reflected in the German term Neidgesellschaft (a society full of envy;
Bolzano, 2007). Similarly, legitimate criticism of asymmetrically distributed wealth is plainly
discounted as Neiddebatte (debate based on envy; Weingartner, 2014; see also Smith, 2015).
Thus, personality characteristics and social factors stimulating envy seem to trigger no out-
comes that serve meaningful functions, neither for the individual nor for society. In accordance
with the stigma of a deadly sin, envy’s supposed intention is nothing but vicious destruction.
Yet, this uniformly negative view collides with recent research on the multifaceted nature
of envy. In line with social-functional approaches to emotions, envy regulates social hierar-
chies by either motivating enviers to increase personal performance—benign envy—or harm
the envied person’s position—malicious envy (Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2009). If
envy’s two forms constitute distinct functional pathways to level status differences, the ques-
tion arises: Which personality characteristics and social factors determine benign or malicious
envy?
In the current dissertation I propose a model for the elicitation of envy. In order to devise
such a model, I will first outline a conceptualization of envy as an emotion syndrome. On the
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basis of this conceptualization, I integrate previous findings regarding general catalysts of en-
vious reactions and I delineate how distinct dispositional and situational moderators might link
envy to self-improvement and harmful tendencies. I predict that dispositional and situational
variables influencing how the status-yielding standard of the other person is appraised should
ultimately shape envy. As a test of this model, I relate forms of achievement motivation—hope
for success and fear of failure (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953)—to disposi-
tional propensities of benign and malicious envy, and ultimately envy-driven behavior. Fur-
thermore, I present evidence relating superior individuals’ pride displays as either authentic
or hubristic pride (Tracy & Robins, 2007) to benignly and maliciously envious responses, re-
spectively.
1.1 A Conceptualization of Envy
Envy is an emotionally frustrating response when someone lacks another’s superior qual-
ity, achievement, or possession (e.g., Parrott & Smith, 1993). Put differently, envy occurs
after threatening upward social comparisons—the basis of each envy episode. In light of the
ubiquity of upward standards and social comparisons in general (Mussweiler, 2003), envy is
most likely a common experience even if often denied (Foster, 1972; Smith & Kim, 2007).
Most previous research converged on the notion that enviers react to such comparisons with
strong resentment and harmful behavior. This pattern was called envy proper (for a review
see Smith & Kim, 2007). Yet, when people were asked to report on envy experiences, they
recalled two qualitatively different forms (Van de Ven et al., 2009). Next to the malicious
manifestation of envy, a second form emerged that entails self-improvement behavior follow-
ing the threatening comparison. Both pathways—improving the self and harming the other’s
position—consequently level the difference between the self and the envied person either by
leveling up the self or leveling the other down (Van de Ven et al., 2009). Interestingly, the
conceptual distinction between benign and malicious envy maps onto linguistic distinctions in
various languages. For instance, the German terms beneiden and missgönnen both translate
into the English term to envy. Similar distinctions exist in Dutch (benijden and afgunst), Rus-
sian (white and black envy), or Arabic (ghibtah and hasad). Nevertheless, even in languages
such as English or Spanish where only one word corresponds to envy, people still recall two
different forms. In all these cases, one form refers to benign envy and one form refers to
malicious envy (Van de Ven et al., 2009).
I argue that the distinction between benign and malicious envy resonates with functional
(Hill & Buss, 2008; Keltner & Gross, 1999) and in particular social-functional approaches
to emotions (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Manstead & Fischer, 2001).
According to these approaches, emotions evolved as adaptive responses to environmental chal-
lenges. Being worse-off in important comparison situations might have detrimental effects on
Jens Lange The elicitation of envy 3
mating success or access to other valuable resources. Therefore, envy is especially frequent
when men lack popularity or financial success and when women feel unattractive (DelPriore,
Hill, & Buss, 2012). Envy’s environmental challenge is inherently social. Envy is inevitably
(at least) dyadic, as it can be elicited only in response to another person’s advantage. If envy’s
social goal is to level the difference between the self and the envied person, it most likely
evolved to establish and maintain social hierarchies, a key social function of emotions (Fis-
cher & Manstead, 2008). In benign envy, the envier engages in behavior to achieve a higher
position in the hierarchy. In contrast, in malicious envy, the envier engages in behavior to
reduce the envied person’s higher hierarchical position. Thus, envy can be regarded as a
social-functional response to status differences. It might serve humans’ fundamental desire
to be respected, admired, and influential (Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015). Yet, so far
this approach is limited in its ability to unravel the complexities of the elicitation of envy. In
order to derive a model I contend that it is important to take the dynamic interplay of various
components of benign and malicious envy into account.
Recent research with respect to the components of envy predominantly investigated com-
munalities and differences of benign and malicious envy. It revealed that both are caused by
equal levels of frustration (Crusius & Lange, 2014) but they differ with respect to their af-
fective, cognitive, and motivational components. Benign envy entails more admiration and
positive thoughts about the envied person (Crusius & Lange, 2014; Van de Ven et al., 2009),
attentional focus on means to reach the upward goal (Crusius & Lange, 2014), desire for the
envy object (Crusius & Mussweiler, 2012), and motivational striving for improvement (Van de
Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2011a). Regarding cognitive underpinnings of its elicitation, be-
nign envy relates to appraisals of high personal control over future outcomes and appraisals of
deservingness of the envied person’s advantage (Lange, Crusius, & Hagemeyer, 2015; Van de
Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2011b). Malicious envy entails resentment and negative thoughts
about the other (Crusius & Lange, 2014; Smith, Parrott, Ozer, & Moniz, 1994; Van de Ven et
al., 2009), as well as attentional focus on the envied person (Crusius & Lange, 2014; see also
Hill, DelPriore, & Vaughan, 2011). Previous research that focused exclusively on malicious
envy indicates that it is also the engine for motivational striving to harm advantaged others via
cheating (Moran & Schweitzer, 2008), undermining their social status (Duffy, Scott, Shaw,
Tepper, & Aquino, 2012), destroying their advantages even at the expense of personal costs
(Zizzo & Oswald, 2001), and feelings of Schadenfreude (pleasure at the other’s misfortune;
Van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, Goslinga, Nieweg, & Gallucci, 2006; Smith et al., 1996; Van de Ven
et al., 2015). Regarding cognitive underpinnings of its elicitation, malicious envy relates to
appraisals of low personal control over future outcomes (or at least less control than benign
envy) and appraisals of undeservingness of the envied person’s advantage (Lange et al., 2015;
Van de Ven et al., 2011b).
How can these diverse findings be integrated to a coherent conceptualization of envy? In
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essence, I propose that the differences between benign and malicious envy are coordinated
strategies. Distinct appraisals guide distinct affective, cognitive, and motivational compo-
nents of emotional responding. These components simultaneously foster progress towards the
distinct social goal that each form of envy relates to. Such an approach integrates emotion
theories based on appraisals (e.g., Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003) and motivational goals (e.g.,
Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994)—a view of emotions as syndromes (e.g., Reisenzein, 2000;
Roseman, 2013; Wallbott & Scherer, 1989). It defines emotions as appraisal-driven organized
response patterns in which different components are probabilistically correlated with each
other. Put differently, individuals constantly evaluate the environment with respect to certain
dimensions. Once a specific pattern of appraisals is encountered, an emotion and its corre-
sponding components are elicited. As all components simultaneously foster progress towards
the emotion’s goal, they are positively correlated. For instance, surprise is elicited when a
situation is appraised as unexpected. This appraisal leads to the experience of surprise, the in-
terruption of ongoing action, attentional focus on the unexpected stimulus, and an evaluation
of it. The intensities of these affective, cognitive, and motivational components are positively
correlated with each other (Reisenzein, 2000). Thus, the appraisal of unexpectedness coordi-
nates all components of the surprise syndrome.
Applied to envy, appraisals of personal control and deservingness should coordinate affec-
tive, cognitive, and motivational components of benign and malicious envy as both are associ-
ated with the envy forms (Lange et al., 2015; Van de Ven et al., 2011b). Specifically, in benign
envy the frustrating situation is appraised as highly controllable and the envied person’s status
is perceived as deserved. Perceiving the other’s higher status as deserved might increase admi-
ration (Feather, 2006). High personal control translates into the general perception of ability
to change current circumstances (Roseman, 2013). This might tune attention to means for im-
provement and guide self-improvement motivation (Bandura, 1977). These components are
coordinated strategies to reach benign envy’s social goal of leveling up the self. In malicious
envy, the frustrating situation is appraised as difficult to control and the envied person’s status
is perceived as undeserved (Lange et al., 2015; Van de Ven et al., 2011b). Perceptions that
the other’s higher status is undeserved might increase resentment (Feather, 2006), a feeling
related to a shift of personal responsibility to the other person (see Smith, 2000; Van de Ven
et al., 2009, 2011b). Thus, perceiving outcomes as undeserved might tune attention towards
the other person. Low personal control translates into the general perception of inability to
change current circumstances (Roseman, 2013). Nevertheless, in helpless states individuals
may still lash out—especially towards those who subjected them to their worse position, such
as in shame situations (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992). In particular, when a
person is publicly devalued based on stable, uncontrollable personality characteristics, anger
is a frequent reaction (see also Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002). Therefore, low per-
sonal control can guide harmful behavior. These components are coordinated strategies to
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reach malicious envy’s goal of leveling the envied person down.
Note that the aforementioned reasoning suggests that the appraisal dimensions are each
linked to only a subset of the affective, cognitive, and motivational components of benign
and malicious envy. In particular, for benign envy, deservingness should relate to the affective
component (admiration), whereas personal control should relate to the cognitive (means focus)
and motivational (improvement motivation) components. For malicious envy, deservingness
should relate to the affective (resentment) and cognitive (person focus) components, whereas
personal control should relate to the motivational component (harming intentions). This dis-
tinct mapping is further supported by other recent evidence. First, the mapping predicts that
personal control may play a stronger role in the elicitation of benign envy, whereas deserv-
ingness may play a stronger role in the elicitation of malicious envy. This prediction was
recently supported by correlational evidence (Lange et al., 2015). Nevertheless, these distinct
links still foster progress towards the same social goals of benign and malicious envy and may,
therefore, lead to a positive correlation between all respective components of each envy form
(for a similar approach to disentangle different components of shame see Gausel, Leach, Vig-
noles, & Brown, 2012). Second, another prediction following from this mapping is that state
benign and malicious envy should be negatively correlated, because both appraisal patterns
necessarily contradict each other. High deservingness simultaneously increases admiration
and decreases resentment as well as the person focus. High personal control simultaneously
increases a means focus as well as self improvement tendencies and decreases harming inten-
tions. In line with this reasoning, recent research provides evidence for a negative correlation
between state benign and malicious envy (Crusius & Lange, 2014). Note that this prediction
may not hold for dispositional envy as people could respond with benign envy in one situation
but with malicious envy in another, even suggesting a positive correlation between the two.
In sum, I conceptualize envy as a social-functional emotion that is based on a frustrating
upward comparison, causing either upward-directed consequences—benign envy—or socially
harmful consequences—malicious envy. Accordingly, the two envy forms are distinct emotion
syndromes driven by appraisals of personal control and deservingness and directed at leveling
the status difference between the self and the envied person. The coordinated strategies of
benign envy entail admiration for the envied person (affective), an attentional focus on means
for improvement (cognitive), and upward motivated striving (motivational; e.g., Crusius &
Lange, 2014; Van de Ven et al., 2009, 2011a). The coordinated strategies of malicious envy
entail resentment for the envied person (affective), an attentional focus on the competitor
(cognitive), and motivated striving to harm the other’s position (motivational; e.g., Crusius
& Lange, 2014; Duffy et al., 2012; Van de Ven et al., 2009). As humans’ pursuit for status
is fundamentally entrenched in their self-concept (Anderson et al., 2015), envy is socially-
functional with respect to establishing and maintaining social hierarchies.
This conceptualization clarifies two further points. First, it contradicts a unitary view of
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envy in which frustration, in response to an unfavorable upward comparison, is the sole en-
gine of either constructive or destructive consequences (Cohen-Charash & Larson, in press;
Tai, Narayanan, & McAllister, 2012). Critically, the unitary view is mute with respect to how
frustration can lead to these diverging outcomes, a theoretical gap clearly outlined in the emo-
tion syndrome approach. Specifically, in the unitary approach, scholars need to incorporate a
multitude of different moderators that predict how frustration leads to either constructive or
destructive consequences (see Tai et al., 2012)—a possibly infinite list. In contrast, an emotion
syndrome approach is more parsimonious, because two appraisal dimensions coordinate the
elicitation of envy’s components—a rather parsimonious approach. Second, the current con-
ceptualization of envy also helps to distinguish it from other related emotions. Envy is often
confused with jealousy. However, jealousy occurs when someone is afraid of losing some-
thing to a competitor, whereas envy occurs when someone lacks another’s advantage (Parrott
& Smith, 1993), suggesting different underlying goals. Furthermore, benign envy resembles
admiration. Yet, admiration is a positive emotion (Crusius & Lange, 2014; Van de Ven et al.,
2009, 2011b), is not based on social comparison processes (Crusius & Lange, 2014; Van de
Ven et al., 2009), and does not foster self-improvement in the respective domain (Van de Ven
et al., 2011a) but rather general emulation (Schindler, Paech, & Löwenbrück, 2015). Finally,
malicious envy resembles resentment. Yet, resentment is not based on social comparison pro-
cesses (Crusius & Lange, 2014; Van de Ven et al., 2009) and is elicited by objectively unfair
situations that violate justice-based rules and not situations appraised as subjectively unde-
served (Leach, 2008; Smith et al., 1994; Van de Ven et al., 2011b).
1.2 The Elicitation of Envy
The current conceptualization of envy serves as a vital starting point to devise a model
for the elicitation of envy (see Figure 1.1). Accordingly, the central element of the model is
an upward social comparison that elicits frustration in the comparer. This comparison pro-
cess underlies every envy situation. Therefore, the first crucial pathway in understanding the
elicitation of envy concerns factors that increase the frequency of upward comparisons as
well as the accompanying frustration and therefore generally increase the probability of envy.
Previous research focused exclusively on this pathway. It revealed that envious responses in-
tensify when individuals have a higher propensity to compare (White, Langer, Yariv, & Welch,
2006) and when individuals are more likely to imagine how situations could have turned out
differently (Van de Ven & Zeelenberg, 2015). Furthermore, in line with research on social
comparisons and their consequences (Tesser, 1988), envy occurs more frequently towards
similar others (Schaubroeck & Lam, 2004) and in domains of high relevance to the self (Del-
Priore et al., 2012; Salovey & Rodin, 1984). These factors transform ordinary comparison
situations into competitions and therefore increase an individual’s comparison concern—the
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desire to reach a superior position relative to another in a particular domain (Garcia, Tor, &
Schiff, 2013). Thus, variables increasing comparison concern enhance envy by fostering the
frequency of social comparisons and their resulting frustration (see Figure 1.1). Given the
general effect of comparison concern it probably increases both envy forms simultaneously.
Therefore, previous research is mute with respect to how certain factors may distinctively elicit
all components of benign and malicious envy.
In contrast, my conceptualization of benign and malicious envy as social-functional emo-
tion syndromes allows to derive specific predictions. Subsequent to the social comparison, the
envier appraises felt personal control and deservingness of the status-yielding standard set by
the envied person. These appraisals may coordinate the affective, cognitive, and motivational
components of benign and malicious envy. When the envier perceives high personal control
and the other person’s high standard is appraised as deserved, benign envy occurs (Van de Ven
et al., 2011b). If the envier perceives low personal control and the other person’s high stan-
dard is appraised as undeserved, malicious envy occurs (Van de Ven et al., 2011b). Based on
the conceptualization that benign and malicious envy are coordinated strategies driven by ap-
praisals, I hypothesize that dispositional or situational factors affecting how the status-yielding
standard of the envied person is appraised should ultimately elicit either benign or malicious
envy. Thus, it is not necessary to incorporate a multitude of moderators into the model to
predict how each component is elicited individually, which the unitary approach requires (Tai
et al., 2012). Therefore, my model is again more parsimonious. But which dispositional and
situational variables might affect personal control and deservingness and might thereby be
pivotal in modulating envy?
Upward Comparison
(Frustration)
Comparison Proneness
Counterfactual Proneness
Similarity
Domain Relevance
Comparison Concern
Benign Envy Malicious Envy
Admiration Resentment
Deservingness Personal Control
Dispositional Moderator Situational Moderator
Means Focus Improvement Motivation Person Focus Harming Intentions
+
+ + - -
-
Appraisal
Figure 1.1. A model for the elicitation of envy.
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The envied person’s high standard for which observers confer status can be regarded as
a standard of excellence. As described above, the goal to reach this standard underlies be-
nign envy, whereas the goal to prevent falling short of this standard underlies malicious envy.
These motivational inclinations map onto distinct forms of achievement motivation—the cen-
tral personality characteristic assessing how individuals deal with a standard of excellence
(McClelland et al., 1953). Put differently, distinct forms of the achievement motive might
be the general engine fueling benign and malicious intentions. On the one hand, individuals
with pronounced hope for success optimistically pursue goals to reach a standard. This should
amplify perceived personal control in response to upward comparisons (as a result of setting
attainable goals and task enjoyment, Lang & Fries, 2006) and therefore stimulate benign envy
(see Van de Ven et al., 2011b), more precisely, the cognitive and motivational components
(see Figure 1.1). If the envier can effectively implement the intention to improve personal per-
formance, hope for success would eventually serve benign envy’s social function of reaching
the standard and thereby gaining status. On the other hand, individuals with a pronounced
fear of failure try to avoid falling short of the standard. This should undermine perceived per-
sonal control in response to upward comparisons (as a result of setting unattainable goals, task
anxiety, and worry, Lang & Fries, 2006) and therefore stimulate malicious envy (see Van de
Ven et al., 2011b), more precisely, the motivational component (see Figure 1.1). Encountering
the envied person then creates the envier’s feared situation of exposure to the unreachable up-
ward standard. As fear of failure is not systematically related to increased performance (Lang
& Fries, 2006), it probably triggers strategies to decrease the status of an individual that the
envier cannot achieve. Therefore, fear of failure would eventually serve malicious envy’s so-
cial function. Thus, I hypothesize that the personality characteristics of hope for success and
fear of failure modulate envy toward its benign or malicious form, respectively. In line with
my model of the elicitation of envy, I predict that achievement motivation (as it relates to the
appraisal of personal control) differentiates benign and malicious envy most strongly for the
motivational component.
Which situational factors might shape appraisals of personal control and deservingness?
The appraisal dimensions concern the status-yielding standard of the envied person. It logi-
cally follows that envy should be a social-functional response to displays and behaviors of the
envied person as these might affect how the standard is appraised. Despite the fact that envy is
inherently social, the envied person has been tacitly neglected in research on envy elicitation.
In contrast, I argue that features of the envied person are crucial for understanding how envy
evolves into its benign or malicious form. If envy’s social function is to establish and maintain
status hierarchies, it should be enhanced by status displays of the competitor above and beyond
mere high achievement. Crucially, the most prevalent and effective means of conveying status
to observers is to display pride (e.g., Martens, Tracy, & Shariff, 2012; Shariff & Tracy, 2009;
Tracy, Shariff, Zhao, & Henrich, 2013), even when contextual information contradicts this
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assessment (e.g., when a homeless person displays pride; Shariff, Tracy, & Markusoff, 2012).
In line with social-functional approaches to emotions, pride displays should affect observers’
responses by conveying specific affective (e.g., liking) and inferential (e.g., how status was
achieved) information (Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef, Van Doorn, Heerdink, & Koning, 2011).
Broadening this dynamic, like envy, pride has two forms (Tracy & Robins, 2007). When suc-
cess is attributed to internal, unstable, controllable causes (e.g., effort), individuals experience
authentic pride. When success is attributed to internal, stable, uncontrollable causes (e.g.,
talent), individuals experience hubristic pride. As such attribution patterns can be inferred
by observers (Hareli & Hess, 2010), the pride forms convey different affective and inferential
information. Authentic pride is likable and conveys status in the form of prestige—respect
for one’s achievement (Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 2013; Cheng, Tracy,
& Henrich, 2010). Accordingly, liking should foster appraisals that the envied person’s ad-
vantage is deserved (Feather, 1999). In addition, prestige conveys the idea that the superior
person is willing to share skills and know-how, which might increase perceptions of personal
control by turning the envied person into a means for improvement (see Crusius & Lange,
2014). Therefore, authentic pride displays should enhance benign envy (see Van de Ven et
al., 2011b). In contrast, hubristic pride is less likable and conveys status in the form of domi-
nance—inducing fear to keep others in their place (Cheng et al., 2013, 2010). Reduced liking
should foster appraisals that the envied person’s advantage is undeserved (Feather, 1999). In
addition, dominance conveys the idea that the social hierarchy is fixed, which might decrease
the perception of personal control as a result of low perceived mutability (see Hays & Ben-
dersky, 2015). Therefore, hubristic pride displays should enhance malicious envy (see Van
de Ven et al., 2011b). Thus, I predict that the envied person’s display of authentic or hubris-
tic pride modulates envy toward its benign or malicious form, respectively. As the conveyed
information of pride displays affects both appraisal dimensions simultaneously, their effects
should occur for all components of benign and malicious envy.
1.3 The Current Research
I propose that benign and malicious envy can be conceptualized as social-functional emo-
tion syndromes in which appraisals of personal control and deservingness coordinate affec-
tive, cognitive, and motivational components directed at leveling a status difference between
the self and the envied person. To understand the elicitation of benign and malicious envy, it is
therefore vital to investigate dispositional and situational variables that might affect appraisals
of the status-yielding standard set by the envied person.
In Chapter 2, I focus on dispositional variables modulating envy. I demonstrate that con-
ceptualizing envy as comprising both benign and malicious forms meaningfully explains the
diverse effects of envy at the trait level. Crucially, dispositional benign and malicious envy
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relate to distinct forms of achievement motivation—hope for success and fear of failure—
changing how the standard set by the envied person is perceived. Based on these motivational
engines, further evidence then links dispositional benign envy to higher goal setting and in-
creased performance in long-distance runners, whereas dispositional malicious envy correlates
with avoidance of specific goals.
In Chapter 3, I focus on situational variables modulating envy. I present evidence regarding
superior individuals’ pride displays as a social variable modulating envy toward its benign or
malicious form. In particular, authentic pride displays are likable and convey status in the
form of prestige, thereby modulating envy toward its benign form. In contrast, hubristic pride
displays are less likable and convey status in the form of dominance, thereby modulating envy
toward its malicious form. The evidence supports the notion that pride displays enhance the
corresponding forms of envy above and beyond mere high achievement when either authentic
or hubristic pride information is conveyed by the envied person. Finally, pride displays affect
benignly and maliciously envious intentions as well as envy-driven behavior.
Note that Chapters 2 and 3 are based on separate published manuscripts. Therefore, each
chapter has its own introduction and discussion. Redundancy is unavoidable. In Chapter 4, I
will discuss the overarching implications, future research opportunities, and limitations of the
model presented here.
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2. Chapter 2 — Dispositional Envy Revisited
Abstract
Previous research has conceptualized dispositional envy as a unitary construct. Recently how-
ever, episodic envy has been shown to emerge in two qualitatively different forms. Benign
envy is related to the motivation to move upward, whereas malicious envy is related to pulling
superior others down. In four studies (N = 1,094)—using the newly developed Benign and
Malicious Envy Scale (BeMaS)—we show that dispositional envy is also characterized by
two independent dimensions related to distinct motivational dynamics and behavioral conse-
quences. Dispositional benign and malicious envy uniquely predict envious responding fol-
lowing upward social comparisons. Furthermore, they are differentially connected to hope for
success and fear of failure. Corresponding to these links, dispositional benign envy predicted
faster race performance of marathon runners mediated via higher goal setting. In contrast,
dispositional malicious envy predicted race goal disengagement. The findings highlight that
disentangling the two sides of envy opens up numerous research avenues.
As a marketer, it would require tremendous effort to advertise envy. According to Catholic
beliefs, it is a deadly sin and Cain’s murder of Abel is only one of the many Biblical warnings
of the dangers of this emotion. Similarly, many fictional portrayals of envious characters such
as Shakespeare’s Iago in Othello or Pushkin’s Salieri paint a grim picture of people who are
consumed by envy, which motivates them to their dastardly deeds. These depictions of envy
not only imply that there are stable inter-individual differences in the tendency to experience
envy, they may also have contributed to a rather negative view of envy in society. Much re-
search confirms the socially destructive power of envy (Smith & Kim, 2007). Yet, semantic
distinctions in several languages, such as the different Russian terms for black and white envy,
suggest that another form of envy exists. One that is similarly characterized by frustrated
desire but lacks the hostility of its vicious counterpart. Indeed, recent research on state envy
has revealed that there is a more benign kind of envy, which elicits upward motivation (e.g.,
Crusius & Lange, 2014; Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2009). Thus, envy can have dis-
tinct motivational consequences. Benign envy increases the motivation to invest more effort to
improve one’s own position. In contrast, malicious envy increases the motivation to harm an
envied person’s success. Here we show that to understand how people differ in their chronic
susceptibility to experience envy and to explain its motivational tendencies, it is necessary to
distinguish between these two kinds of envy also on the trait level. Doing so sheds light on
the distinct motivational dynamics of envy by linking each envy form to global motivational
dispositions and to concrete behavior.
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2.1 Social Comparison and Envy
Envy is defined as a negative emotional response to another person’s superior quality,
achievement, or possession, in which the envier either desires the advantage or wishes that
the envied person lacks it (Parrott & Smith, 1993; Smith & Kim, 2007). In its essence, envy
is always based on an upward social comparison. Such a comparison is particularly likely to
result in envy if it is directed toward similar others and if it concerns domains of high relevance
to the self (Salovey & Rodin, 1984).
Social comparisons are a fundamental element of human cognition. People engage in so-
cial comparisons habitually (e.g., Corcoran, Crusius, & Mussweiler, 2011; Mussweiler, 2003)
and automatically (Mussweiler, Rüter, & Epstude, 2004), explaining why envy is such a com-
mon and culturally universal experience (Foster, 1972). Nevertheless, people also vary sys-
tematically in their propensity to compare themselves with others (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999).
Therefore, it is safe to predict that they will also exhibit stable inter-individual differences
in their propensity to experience envy. In fact, much evidence has firmly established that
dispositional envy exists and that it determines important psychological and behavioral out-
comes (Gold, 1996; Smith, Parrott, Diener, Hoyle, & Kim, 1999; Veselka, Giammarco, &
Vernon, 2014). Importantly, however, these efforts to measure envy as a trait have not taken
into account that, at the state level, two qualitatively different forms of envy exist: benign and
malicious envy.
2.2 Benign and Malicious Envy
Envy has consistently been referred to as a deadly sin, implying that malicious tendencies
are an essential element of envy. However, prominent scholars and intellectuals such as Aris-
totle (1929), Dorothy L. Sayers (1969), and John Rawls (1999) have observed that another
kind of envy exists. This benign, emulative form of envy can increase the desire to get what
the envied person has, but lacks the hostility characterizing its malicious counterpart. In many
languages, there are two different words for envy, substantiating such a distinction. For in-
stance, in Dutch, there are the words benijden and afgunst, and in German this is paralleled by
the words beneiden and missgönnen (Crusius & Lange, 2014; Van de Ven et al., 2009). The
first word implies a more upward motivating form of envy, whereas the second word desig-
nates envy’s hostile form. Perhaps the clearest occurrence of this etymological difference is
present in Russian, in which there is white and black envy. Still, even in languages that allow
a semantic distinction of the two forms of envy, there may also exist an inclusive term. For
example, in German, the words Neid (envy) and neidisch (envious) capture both envy forms
simultaneously. At the same time, languages such as English or Spanish have only one word
for envy. Nevertheless, when speakers of these languages are asked to report such an instance,
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they report one of two qualitatively distinct emotional episodes matching the distinction be-
tween benign and malicious envy (Van de Ven et al., 2009). Thus, there is evidence that the
two forms of envy exist independently of language differences.
From a functionalist perspective, the two forms of envy may reflect two different routes
through which people can achieve the goal to level the difference between the self and a
superior comparison standard (Van de Ven et al., 2009). On the one hand, in benign envy,
enviers may try to level themselves up to become as successful as the other person. This
notion is supported by findings showing that envy can increase personal effort (Schaubroeck
& Lam, 2004; Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2011c), propel behavior aimed at obtaining
a desired object (Crusius & Mussweiler, 2012), and shift attention toward means to attain
it (Crusius & Lange, 2014). Recent research suggests that envy-eliciting situations result in
benign envy if the envied person’s advantage is evaluated as subjectively deserved and if the
envier perceives high control over personal outcomes (Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters,
2011a).
On the other hand, in malicious envy, enviers may try to level the envied person down,
decreasing or denigrating the advantage of the other. This notion is supported by findings
showing that envy can increase schadenfreude (Smith et al., 1996; Van de Ven et al., 2014;
Van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, Goslinga, Nieweg, & Gallucci, 2006), lead to hostile and resentful
behaviors (Duffy, Scott, Shaw, Tepper, & Aquino, 2012; Salovey & Rodin, 1984), and shift
attention toward the envied person (Crusius & Lange, 2014; Hill, DelPriore, & Vaughan,
2011). Envy-eliciting situations result in malicious envy if the envied person’s advantage is
evaluated as subjectively undeserved and the envier experiences less control over personal
outcomes (Van de Ven et al., 2011a). Nevertheless, both forms of envy involve equivalent
degrees of highly negative affect and frustration (e.g., Crusius & Lange, 2014).
In spite of substantial evidence in favor of the two forms of envy at the state level (Belk,
2011; Crusius & Lange, 2014; Van de Ven et al., 2009; Van de Ven et al., 2011a; Van de Ven,
Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2011b; Van de Ven et al., 2011c), this distinction has not been taken
into account in the investigation of dispositional envy.
2.3 Existing Trait Measures of Envy
Three scales have been introduced to measure trait envy, all of them conceptualizing it as a
single dimension. However, what form of envy was focal in these scales, benign or malicious
envy?
First, Gold (1996) developed the York Enviousness Scale. Although he cites work con-
necting envy to improvement motivation, Gold explicitly differentiates covetousness from it.
Instead, the scale is focused on resentment and ill will. These emotional facets should be in-
dicators of malicious but not of benign envy. In addition, the scale correlates positively with
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anger and hostility, which, according to our reasoning, reflect only malicious envy.
Second, Smith et al. (1999) developed the Dispositional Envy Scale (DES), which is the
most widely used measure of envy as a personality trait. The scale is composed of items mea-
suring inferiority, ill will, frustration, and perceptions of injustice. It correlates with negative
self-esteem, depression, neuroticism, hostility, and resentment. With the exception of frus-
tration and a sense of inferiority, which should characterize both benign and malicious envy,
most of the emotional facets and correlates of the DES should again be indicative of malicious
but not of benign envy.
Finally, Veselka et al. (2014) recently developed the Vices and Virtues Scale to measure
dispositional tendencies to commit deadly sins, including a subscale to measure envy. Their
items also focus on resentment and anger, and should thus be concerned only with malicious
envy.
2.4 Dispositional Benign and Malicious Envy and Their Motivational Dynamics
In summary, dispositional envy is a comparison-based emotional trait that leads to frus-
tration when people are confronted with an upward standard. However, parallel to state envy,
we predict that there are two forms of dispositional envy, namely dispositional benign and
malicious envy. Apart from the aforementioned commonalities, they should be uniquely con-
nected to distinct motivational dynamics and, ultimately, to distinct envious behavior. In that
sense, differentiating between two forms of envious responding at the trait level should allow
to elucidate how dispositional envy predicts these outcomes and which form explains the spe-
cific relationships. What are the important constructs related to envy and how are dispositional
benign and malicious envy uniquely connected to them?
Most importantly, as described above, envy is related to a multitude of motivational goals
that may result from upward comparisons. In general, envy’s functional goal is to level the
difference between the self and the envied person (Van de Ven et al., 2009). In the case of
benign envy, the envier tries to level up whereas in the case of malicious envy, the envier
tries to level the envied person down. Thus, in both envy forms, the envier is concerned
with a standard of excellence—the level of the envied person—in a domain of high relevance
to the self (Salovey & Rodin, 1984). Situations in which individuals are concerned with
a personally important standard of excellence trigger the achievement motive (McClelland,
Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953). The achievement motive also has two components that
differ in how individuals respond to this standard of excellence: hope for success and fear of
failure (Atkinson, 1957). Hope for success leads to an approach toward the standard, whereas
fear of failure leads to avoidance of failing to reach it. We contend that these motivational
tendencies fuel dispositional benign and malicious envy and explain their distinct behavioral
patterns.
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The optimistic disposition of hope for success should lead to appraisals of perceived con-
trol over future outcomes. In other words, it should be connected to perceiving oneself as
capable of achieving success. In an upward comparison situation, the standard of excellence
is represented by the level of the envied person. Given that enviers perceive personal con-
trol over the ability to reach this standard, benign envy should be spurred (Van de Ven et al.,
2011a). Therefore, hope for success should predict dispositional benign envy and lead to mo-
tivated behavior directed at achieving this standard. This is in line with previous findings that
have linked state envy to upward-directed motivational tendencies (Crusius & Lange, 2014;
Van de Ven et al., 2011c). As previous research on dispositional envy did not investigate
benign envy, this relationship awaits empirical scrutiny.
In contrast, we predict that dispositional malicious envy is fueled by a general motivation
to avoid falling short of a standard of excellence. Such a pessimistic disposition should lead
to an appraisal of low perceived control over future outcomes. Low control, in turn, is linked
to malicious envy (Van de Ven et al., 2011a). In this case, enviers perceive an inability to ever
reach the standard. From a functional perspective, in such a situation, it makes more sense
to alter the standard to decrease the threat resulting from it. In an upward comparison, this
implies that the envier tries to harm the envied person’s success. Therefore, fear of failure
should be related to dispositional malicious envy and ultimately avoidant behavior toward
this standard. This is in line with previous findings linking state envy to hostile motivational
tendencies (Smith & Kim, 2007). As previous scales measuring dispositional envy were—
presumably—mostly concerned with dispositional malicious envy, this reasoning might also
explain why the DES has been linked to antisocial behavior such as diminished cooperation
in social dilemmas (Parks, Rumble, & Posey, 2002) and chronic schadenfreude about others’
misfortune (Krizan & Johar, 2012).
In summary, recent research on episodic envy suggests that a one-dimensional conceptu-
alization of envy does not capture the full spectrum of the motivational dynamics related to
experiences of envy and envious responding. We contend that, similar to the state level, there
are two distinct forms of envy at the trait level: dispositional benign and malicious envy. In
what follows, we report four studies investigating this possibility. In Study 2.1, we develop
the Benign and Malicious Envy Scale (BeMaS). In Study 2.2, we demonstrate convergent and
discriminant validity of the BeMaS. We show that dispositional benign and malicious envy
dissociate motivational intentions to improve personal performance from motivational inten-
tions to harm when people are confronted with an upward comparison standard. In Study 2.3,
we demonstrate that hope for success is linked to the motivational tendencies of dispositional
benign envy. However, fear of failure and less hope for success are linked to the motivational
tendencies of dispositional malicious envy. Study 2.4 shows that the motivational dynamics of
dispositional benign and malicious envy translate into the race performance of long-distance
runners.
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2.5 Study 2.1
The goal of Study 2.1 was to develop a measure for dispositional benign and malicious
envy.
2.5.1 Method.
Participants. We recruited 365 participants1 from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) with
a mean age of 25.69 years (SD = 8.91) of which 258 were male.
Materials and procedure. Initially, we generated 23 items potentially measuring disposi-
tional benign envy and 25 items potentially measuring dispositional malicious envy based on
previous research on the experience, motivational consequences, and action tendencies of the
two emotions. We instructed participants that the items referred to situations in which they
lack another’s superior quality, achievement, or possession and either desire it or wish the
other lacks it. This was done to prevent any confusion regarding the terms envy and jealousy
(see Parrott & Smith, 1993). The latter refers to situations in which people are afraid of losing
something they already possess (mostly a relationship) and is distinct from envy.
The potential benign envy items focused on liking of the envied other (e.g., „I have warm
feelings toward top performers“), increased effort caused by envy (e.g., „I strive to reach
other people’s superior achievements“), and increased goal setting after upward comparisons
(e.g., „If someone has superior qualities, achievements, or possessions, I try to attain them
for myself“). The malicious envy items focused on hostile behavior (e.g., „If other people
have something that I want for myself, I wish to take it away from them.“), resentful feelings
toward the envied person (e.g., „Seeing other people’s achievements makes me resent them“),
and general feelings of anger in relation to upward comparisons (e.g., „I hate to encounter
people I envy“). Participants indicated their agreement on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).
We also added the DES (Smith et al., 1999) as the most popular trait envy measure to
investigate our prediction that this scale primarily measures dispositional malicious and not
1For this and all of the subsequent studies, we report all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures.
The sample size of each study was set in advance. In Studies 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, we restricted our analyses a
priori to native speakers who were in the United States during testing, indicated that they were not fairly or
very distracted during the study, indicated that they comprehended the tasks and instructions, and that we can
include their data into our analyses (Meade & Craig, 2012). This led to the exclusion of 22 participants in
Study 2.1, 7 participants in Study 2.2, and 10 participants in Study 2.3. In Study 2.4, we did not collect these
data to keep the questionnaire as short as possible. For more information on the diversity of the demographic
variables and the overall good quality of personality psychology research conducted with MTurk samples,
see Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling (2011).
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benign envy.
2.5.2 Results and discussion.
Exploratory factor analyses with oblimin rotation clearly revealed two factors in the scree
plot. Items measuring likability of the envied person typically loaded highly on both factors
and were therefore excluded. Based on our results, we chose six items for each subscale.
These items had good psychometric properties, loaded highly on their intended factor and not
on the other, fitted our understanding of benign and malicious envy, and several contained the
word envy.
The Dispositional Benign Envy subscale (α = .85) and the Dispositional Malicious Envy
subscale (α = .89) were both internally consistent. The scales were not correlated, r(365) =
.01, p= .89. The DES showed no significant relation with the Dispositional Benign Envy sub-
scale, r(365) = .04, p = .46, but was significantly correlated with the Dispositional Malicious
Envy subscale, r(365) = .65, p < .001.
After this initial study, feedback from colleagues and further results led us to refine the
scale in some details. An English native speaker pointed out that the formulation of one item
used a somewhat uncommon word, which we then exchanged with a more frequent synonym.
In addition, in later studies with the BeMaS, one benign envy item repeatedly loaded highly on
both the Dispositional Benign and Malicious Envy subscales. We therefore decided to delete
this item from the scale. To even out the number of items, we also excluded another mali-
cious item whose content was covered by others. This led to the final version of the BeMaS
(see Table 2.1). We tested the internal structure of the BeMaS with an independent sample
(N = 933). A structural equation model with two correlated factors—dispositional benign and
malicious envy—showed good fit to the data, χ2(34) = 189.89, p< .001, goodness of fit index
(GFI) = .96, comparative fit index (CFI) = .97, adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI) = .93,
and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .07, 95% confidence interval (CI)
= [.06; .08] (for details and further results, see the Appendix A).2 We then also translated the
English scale into German.3
2We also tested the temporal stability of the Benign and Malicious Envy Scale (BeMaS) over a 3- to 4-week
interval. These analyses confirmed the temporal stability of the BeMaS. Details can be found in Appendix A.
3In the Dispositional Benign Envy subscale, the term envy was translated into the German word for benign
envy, beneiden. In the Dispositional Malicious Envy subscale, the term envy was translated into the German
word that captures both envy forms, Neid.
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Table 2.1. The Benign and Malicious Envy Scale (BeMaS) and Factor Loadings of Each
Item.
Item Benign Envy Malicious Envy
(1) When I envy others, I focus on how I can be-
come equally successful in the future.
.84 -.09
(3) If I notice that another person is better than me,
I try to improve myself.
.84 -.11
(4) Envying others motivates me to accomplish my
goals.
.76 .11
(7) I strive to reach other people’s superior achieve-
ments.
.84 .02
(9) If someone has superior qualities, achieve-
ments, or possessions, I try to attain them for
myself.
.81 .09
(2) I wish that superior people lose their advantage. .03 .72
(5) If other people have something that I want for
myself, I wish to take it away from them.
.05 .81
(6) I feel ill will toward people I envy. -.04 .89
(8) Envious feelings cause me to dislike the other
person.
-.03 .84
(10) Seeing other people’s achievements makes me
resent them.
-.01 .88
Note. Factor loadings were taken from a factor analysis with oblimin rotation with the collapsed samples from Study 2.2, Study 2.3, and
Appendix A (N = 933). Numbers in parentheses refer to the item’s position in the full scale. Factor loadings > .30 are written in bold.
2.6 Study 2.2
The goal of Study 2.2 was to establish convergent and discriminant validity of the BeMaS.
More precisely, we wanted to test whether it can predict the diverse motivational consequences
of envy. On the one hand, benign envy spurs upward-directed behavior aimed at leveling one-
self up. On the other hand, malicious envy spurs socially harmful behavior aimed at leveling
the other person down. In Study 2.2, we confronted participants with an upward social com-
parison standard. If the BeMaS (assessed in a previous session) measures stable differences in
envious responding, it should predict the specific emotional reactions toward this comparison
standard. More specifically, we hypothesized that dispositional benign envy would predict
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benign envy at the state level and that dispositional malicious envy would predict malicious
envy at the state level. However, dispositional benign envy should neither correlate with state
malicious envy nor should dispositional malicious envy correlate with state benign envy. This
would constitute evidence for the full pattern of a double dissociation (Teuber, 1955).
Also of interest were correlations of dispositional benign and malicious envy with per-
ceived deservingness and the intensity of participants’ negative affect. Being an important ap-
praisal dimension distinguishing the two forms of envy, we expected dispositional benign envy
to correlate positively, but dispositional malicious envy to correlate negatively with deserving-
ness. Furthermore, we expected both dispositional benign and malicious envy to predict the
intensity of negative affect experienced in the situation. The latter prediction is important
because it establishes that the BeMaS does not capture admiration instead of benign envy.
Benign envy entails a certain amount of admiration for the more advantaged other. However,
the two emotions are also associated with distinct thoughts, action tendencies, motivational
goals, and appraisal patterns. Most importantly, whereas benign envy is a negative emotion,
admiration is a positive emotion (Crusius & Lange, 2014; Van de Ven et al., 2009; Van de Ven
et al., 2011a, 2011c). Just as dispositional malicious envy, dispositional benign envy should
thus predict negative affect.
2.6.1 Method.
Participants. We recruited 194 participants from MTurk and instructed them to complete
the BeMaS and several other measures unrelated to the current study. We contacted the same
participants 3 to 4 weeks later offering them the participation in another study. Of the original
sample, 167 participants followed this invitation resulting in a response rate of 85%. Mean
age was 31.83 years (SD = 10.47). One hundred and ten were male.
MTurk workers typically participate in several different studies each day. Furthermore,
we did not mention that we contacted them because of their previous participation in a study
including the BeMaS. Finally, we administered the BeMaS along with other measures in the
first wave of data collection. Therefore, this study constitutes a strong test of the construct
validity of the BeMaS.
Materials and procedure. All participants were workers on the crowdsourcing platform
MTurk. On MTurk, workers can earn money by completing diverse tasks such as categorizing
photographs, describing products, or completing surveys. Although the average pay on MTurk
can be assumed to be quite low, many workers rely on MTurk as one important source of their
income, and the success in doing so is a frequent topic of discussion on Internet forums that
specialize on MTurk. That is why we chose success on MTurk as a comparison dimension to
elicit envy.
To do so, we confronted MTurk workers with an alleged interview of another MTurk
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worker with the gender-neutral name, Alex, supposedly taken from an MTurk Internet fo-
rum. To create a highly realistic appearance, we modified the HTML source code of a popular
MTurk forum and embedded a screenshot of it in our survey. According to the interview, Alex
is highly successful, earning at least $10 per hour, recently even $12 with a record of $17.
Alex explained that his or her success might be due to the fact that he or she is working very
hard and diligently, resulting in a spotless approval record for his or her work on MTurk (nev-
ertheless, the interview contained several spelling mistakes). In addition, he or she explained
that part of his or her success is being a so-called Master Worker. This status allows MTurk
workers to access tasks that are often better paid than other tasks. It is awarded by Amazon
to workers who prove to be reliable. However, the criteria for assessing this are not transpar-
ent. In the interview, Alex acknowledges this fact by stating that he or she became Master
Worker for unknown reasons, it could well be random. From previous studies, we knew that
this description is highly believable and an upward standard for almost all MTurk workers
(Faulmüller & Crusius, 2014; Lange, Crusius, & Hagemeyer, 2015). Because the factors that
contributed to Alex’ success were only partly controllable and deserved, Alex was ambiguous
with regard to the possibility to elicit state benign and malicious envy.
After reading the interview, participants responded to four items adapted from Crusius and
Lange (2014) and Van de Ven et al. (2009) measuring benign envy (α = .88; e.g., „Alex’s
success inspires me to put more effort in earning a higher wage on MTurk“), four items re-
lated to malicious envy (α= .86; e.g., „I wish that Alex would fail at something“), three items
related to perceptions of deservingness (α = .89; e.g., „Alex does not deserve to be so suc-
cessful“[reverse coded]), and three items related to intensity of negative affect (α= .90; e.g.,
„It frustrates me that I don’t earn as much as Alex“) on a scale from 1 (does not apply at all)
to 7 (applies very much).
2.6.2 Results and discussion.
As predicted, dispositional benign envy was related to benignly envious responses toward
Alex, r(167) = .30, p < .001, but not to maliciously envious responses, r(167) < .01, p =
.99. Dispositional malicious envy was related to maliciously envious responses toward Alex,
r(167) = .44, p < .001, but not to benignly envious responses, r(167) = .02, p = .84. As
predicted, this constitutes the full pattern of a double dissociation in which dispositional be-
nign and malicious envy are connected distinctively to upward-directed or harmful behavior
following an unflattering upward comparison.
In addition, dispositional benign envy was unrelated to deservingness, r(167) =−.12, p=
.13, whereas dispositional malicious envy showed a negative correlation, r(167) =−.40, p <
.001. We are uncertain of why there was no positive relationship of dispositional benign envy
with deservingness as we had predicted based on findings at the state level (e.g., Van de Ven
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et al., 2011a). Yet, recent evidence suggests that the effects of benign envy are more strongly
driven by perceptions of personal control than deservingness appraisals, whereas for malicious
envy, the reverse applies (Lange, Crusius, & Hagemeyer, 2015).
However, dispositional benign envy, r(167) = .15, p = .06, and dispositional malicious
envy, r(167) = .27, p < .001, were both related to intensity of negative affect. Despite being
marginally significant, the correlation of dispositional benign envy and frustration was not
significantly different from the correlation of dispositional malicious envy with frustration,
z = −1.34, p = .18. This result underlines that both dispositions increase the pain felt after
upward comparisons and that dispositional benign envy is distinct from admiration.
2.7 Study 2.3
In Study 2.2, we collected first evidence for the distinct motivational dynamics of envy
that can be unraveled by the BeMaS. State benign and malicious envy as measured in Study
2.2 implied concrete motivational tendencies, for instance the inspiration to invest more effort
or the wish that the envied person would fail. In Study 3, we wanted to go one step further by
linking dispositional benign and malicious envy to broad underlying motivational tendencies:
hope for success and fear of failure.
We reasoned that dispositional benign envy is fueled by a general motivation to reach
a standard of excellence and thereby achieve success. Therefore, hope for success should be
related to dispositional benign envy. In contrast, we reasoned that dispositional malicious envy
is fueled by a general motivation to avoid falling short of a standard of excellence. Therefore,
fear of failure should be related to dispositional malicious envy.
The core underlying process of this conceptualization is a social comparison. Thus, al-
though dispositional benign envy should be related to hope for success and dispositional ma-
licious envy to fear of failure, both should be positively correlated with a general tendency to
compare, establishing convergent validity. These predictions were of focal interest in Study
2.3.
2.7.1 Method.
Participants. We recruited 192 participants on MTurk with a mean age of 31.6 years
(SD = 9.95). One hundred twenty-one were male.
Materials and procedure. Among other scales unrelated to the current study, participants
completed the BeMaS to measure dispositional benign (α = .84) and malicious envy (α =
.90), as well as scales to measure hope for success, fear of failure, and general comparison
propensity.
We included the revised version of the Achievement Motives Scale (AMS-R; Lang & Fries,
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2006) to measure hope for success (α= .83; e.g., „I am attracted by tasks, in which I can test
my abilities“) and fear of failure (α = .86; e.g., „I feel uneasy to do something if I am not
sure of succeeding“). Answers were given on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly
agree).
As a measure of the dispositional tendency to compare, we used the Iowa-Netherlands
Comparison Orientation Measure (INCOM; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999; α= .87; e.g., „I always
pay a lot of attention to how I do things compared with how others do things“). Participants
responded on a scale from 1 (I disagree strongly) to 5 (I agree strongly). Although the scale
is typically used with a composite score, the authors suggested that some items measure com-
parison propensity related to abilities and other items measure comparison propensity related
to personal opinions. We predicted that the correlation of dispositional benign and malicious
envy with comparison propensity should be stronger for the ability subscale as opinions are
usually not a domain that elicits envy (DelPriore, Hill, & Buss, 2012).
2.7.2 Results and discussion.
Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations of the scales can be found in Table 2.2.
As predicted, dispositional benign envy was positively related to hope for success but unre-
lated to fear of failure. In contrast, dispositional malicious envy was positively related to fear
of failure and even negatively related to hope for success. Both forms of dispositional envy,
however, were positively correlated with comparison propensity, especially with the compari-
son propensity regarding abilities.
To verify our predictions and to control for the correlation of hope for success and fear of
failure, we also ran two regression analyses. Specifically, we regressed dispositional benign
envy simultaneously on hope for success and fear of failure. Confirming the hypothesized
pattern, hope for success predicted dispositional benign envy, B = 0.71,SE = 0.13, p < .001,
whereas for fear of failure, the association was marginal, B = 0.15,SE = 0.09, p = .08. Re-
peating the same analysis with dispositional malicious envy as criterion revealed a significant
positive relationship for fear of failure, B = 0.33,SE = 0.11, p = .002, but also a significant
negative relationship for hope for success, B =−0.48,SE = 0.16, p = .002.
In summary, a motivation to reach a standard of excellence is linked to dispositional benign
envy, whereas a motivation to avoid falling short of such a standard is linked to dispositional
malicious envy. In addition, dispositional malicious envy was negatively correlated with hope
for success. Thus, not only do maliciously envious people fear to not live up to a standard of
excellence, they even actively refrain from pursuing it.
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Table 2.2. Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations of the Scales Used in Study
2.3.
M(SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Benign envya 4.12 (0.92) —
2 Malicious envya 2.54 (1.13) -.07 —
3 Hope for successb 3.12 (0.50) .37* -.26* —
4 Fear of failureb 2.75 (0.73) .05 .26* -.19* —
5 INCOMc 3.39 (0.68) .26* .21* .10 .39* —
6 INCOM abilityc 3.09 (0.88) .27* .26* .00 .41* .92* —
7 INCOM opinionc 3.76 (0.66) .16* .07 .23* .23* .79* .49* —
Note. N = 192.
a Participants responded on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).
b Participants responded on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).
c Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure.Participants responded on a scale from 1 (I disagree strongly) to 5 (I agree strongly).
∗p < .05
2.8 Study 2.4
The goal of Study 2.4 was to extend the findings regarding the motivational dynamics of
envy by investigating the behavioral effects of dispositional benign envy in a field setting.
The current perspective and evidence strongly suggest that past research on dispositional envy
was exclusively focused on malicious envy. Being the form of envy with a longer research
history, malicious envy has been linked to many important real-world outcomes such as social
undermining in working groups (Duffy et al., 2012) or deception in negotiations (Moran &
Schweitzer, 2008). There is less evidence for behavioral effects of state benign envy, and it
remains to be investigated how dispositional benign envy is related to real-world behavior and
outcomes.
One highly self-relevant domain, in which the success of others is often interpreted as jus-
tified and personal control over one’s accomplishments appraised as high, is athletic achieve-
ment. In sports, superior comparison standards typically invest much effort into training to
reach their goals. Therefore, benign envy should occur frequently among competitive individ-
uals and may have beneficial effects with regard to their performance.
Study 3 has shown that dispositional benign envy is associated with a general motivational
tendency to optimistically pursue standards of excellence. We wondered whether this cor-
responds to the actual performance of long-distance runners in an important race. Usually,
runners practice multiple times per week and are likely exposed to several upward compari-
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son standards during training as well as during their races. These upward comparisons could
elicit envy. The connection of dispositional benign envy to hope for success should lead to an
adoption of this high standard of excellence. To put it differently, dispositional benign envy
should increase goal setting during training. Given that goal setting predicts performance, this
goal, in turn, should spur the motivation to excel during training and, ultimately, the race.
Dispositional malicious envy, on the other hand, should be unrelated to performance in
long-distance running. Study 2.3 has shown that malicious envy is linked to a fear of not
living up to a certain standard and decreases motivation to reach such a goal. Therefore, being
exposed to upward comparison standards during training should not lead to the adoption of a
higher goal and therefore not to increased performance during the race.
To investigate these hypotheses, in Study 2.4, we measured participants’ dispositional be-
nign and malicious envy shortly before they took part in a marathon or a half marathon. They
also indicated the goal they had set themselves for their race. We hypothesized that disposi-
tional benign envy would predict race performance mediated via higher goal setting. Disposi-
tional malicious envy should not show this pattern.
2.8.1 Method.
Participants. In total, 474 individuals participated in this study. We excluded the data
of 36 individuals who, instead of running the regular half or full marathon, participated in
smaller, non-comparable races taking place at the same time (e.g., the team relay marathon). In
addition, the questionnaires of 23 individuals could not be matched to their race results because
they did not provide a race number or because their race number was illegible. Furthermore, 21
individuals had no race results because they either did not start in the race, were disqualified,
or started but did not finish the race. Finally, 23 individuals did not indicate a specific time
goal (they left the field blank or stated that they just wanted to finish the race). One participant
indicated an extreme time goal for the marathon (it was much faster than the world record),
which was most likely an error. The remaining sample4 consisted of 370 participants, 208
of them ran the half marathon and 162 the full marathon. They were 17 to 78 years old
(M = 39.60, SD = 10.67), and 252 were male.
Materials and procedure. We approached the runners on the 2 days before the race when
they picked up their race number at the Cologne Marathon exhibition. We invited them to take
part in a study on the effects of social comparisons on sports performance in exchange for the
chance to win a gift voucher in a lottery. In the questionnaire, they were asked to indicate their
race number, to complete the benign (α = .79) and malicious envy (α = .83) items,5 and to
4A binary logistic regression showed that neither dispositional benign envy, B = .0.08, standard error (SE) =
0.12, χ2(1) = 0.41, p = .52, odds ratio (OR) = 0.93, nor dispositional malicious envy, B = .03, SE = 0.15,
χ2(1) = 0.04, p = .84, OR = 1.03, predicted the likelihood of data exclusion.
5This study was conducted with our first translation of the BeMaS into German. Unfortunately, we later learned
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indicate the time goal they had set themselves for their race. After the race, we downloaded
the runners’ race results and their demographic data, which were publicly available from the
website of the Cologne Marathon, using the individual race numbers as identifiers.
2.8.2 Results and discussion.
We present descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations in Table 2.3. We used the av-
erage running speed in kilometers per hour as dependent variable. Runners’ time goal was also
transformed into a speed goal. As predicted, dispositional benign envy was positively related
to higher goal setting and performance during the race. In contrast, dispositional malicious
envy was unrelated to these variables.
Table 2.3. Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations of the Variables in Study 2.4.
M(SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Benign envya 3.41 (1.03) —
2 Malicious envya 1.58 (0.77) .32* —
3 Age 39.60 (10.67) -.23* -.18* —
4 Genderb 0.32 (0.47) .10+ .03 -.23* —
5 Race typec 0.44 (0.50) -.02 -.05 .11* -.24* —
6 Race goald 10.77 (1.50) .12* -.03 .05 -.31* .05 —
7 Race speedd 10.67 (1.48) .11* -.01 .02 -.32* .02 .86* —
Note. N = 370. Spearman correlations.
a Participants responded on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).
b 0 = male, 1 = female.
c 0 = half marathon, 1 = full marathon.
d Kilometers per hour.
+p < .10, ∗p < .05
We then tested the hypothesis that the goal runners had set for themselves before the
race mediated the relationship between dispositional benign envy and race performance. We
present the results of the mediation analysis controlling for age, gender, type of race, and dis-
positional malicious envy in Figure 2.1. The indirect effect in a bootstrap mediation analysis
with 5,000 bootstrap re-samples and bias-corrected CI (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) was signif-
that one dispositional malicious envy item did not load highly on the respective scale. This item was later
slightly rephrased, which corrected this problem. However, our predictions were mostly centered on disposi-
tional benign envy.
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icant, ab = .15, 95% CI = [.03; .28], Sobel Z = 2.56, p = .01. Repeating the same analysis
with dispositional malicious envy as predictor yielded no significant indirect effect, ab=−.09,
95% CI = [−.27; .09], Sobel Z =−1.14, p = .26.6
Dispositional
Benign Envy
Race Speed
in km/h
Race Goal
in km/h
0.19* 0.81*
0.02 (0.17*)
Figure 2.1. Mediation effect of dispositional benign envy on race speed via race goal
controlling for age, gender, race type, and dispositional malicious envy. ∗p < .05
Although not anticipated, we noted during data collection that not every runner had set
a specific time goal for the race. This enabled us to test another hypothesis in Study 2.4.
According to our reasoning, dispositional malicious envy is fueled by a fear of not living
up to a standard of excellence and also less motivation to reach this goal. In other words,
dispositional malicious envy should lead to an active avoidance of a specific goal. This would
be in line with the dynamics of enviers’ underlying motives. In the current study, a number
of participants did not indicate a concrete race goal although we explicitly asked for it. We
tested whether dispositional benign and malicious envy predicted the tendency to indicate
no goal. To this end, we ran a logistic regression in which we regressed goal (0 = goal
indicated, 1 = no goal indicated) on dispositional benign and malicious envy, controlling for
age, sex, and type of race. In line with our reasoning, dispositional benign envy marginally
predicted the adoption of a concrete race goal, B = .0.42, SE = 0.23,χ2(1) = 3.34, p = .07,
odds ratio (OR) = 0.66, 95% CI = [0.42;1.03]. However, also as hypothesized, dispositional
6We also tested a full model with structural equation modeling such that dispositional benign and malicious
envy served as parallel predictors. The results are the same but the model is less parsimonious. Details can
be found in Appendix A.
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malicious envy significantly predicted the avoidance of a concrete race goal, B = 0.49, SE =
0.18,χ2(1) = 7.30, p = .01, OR = 1.64, 95% CI = [1.14;2.34].
In summary, our hypotheses were supported. Higher goal setting mediated the associa-
tion of dispositional benign envy on race performance. This constitutes the first evidence for
behavioral correlates of dispositional benign envy with a real-world behavioral outcome. In
addition, we also found that dispositional malicious envy predicted the active avoidance of a
concrete race goal. Together, these findings strongly support the contention that dispositional
benign and malicious envy are connected to distinct motivational dynamics.
2.9 General Discussion
Previous research has treated dispositional envy as a unitary construct. In contrast, recent
research on state envy has shown that people may react to threatening upward comparisons
with two qualitatively distinct forms of envy: benign envy, which involves the motivational
tendency to improve oneself, and malicious envy, which is aimed at pulling the superior other
down. We predicted that people also differ in their propensity to experience benign and ma-
licious envy. To capture the two envy forms on the trait level, we developed the BeMaS,
which uniquely predicts benign and malicious reactions in comparison situations. We further
reasoned that dispositional benign envy is fueled by an optimistic achievement motive and is
associated with the adoption of a standard of excellence provided by the envied person and,
ultimately, increased performance. In contrast, dispositional malicious envy should be fueled
by a pessimistic fear of not living up to the standard of excellence provided by the envied
person and the active disengagement of such a goal.
The data confirm our predictions. They reveal that dispositional benign and malicious envy
can be measured as distinct forms of envious responding (Study 2.1). Furthermore, the data
show that the DES (Smith et al., 1999)—the most widely used scale to measure dispositional
envy so far—exclusively taps into dispositional malicious envy. In addition, the BeMaS pre-
dicts benignly and maliciously envious responses toward an upward social comparison stan-
dard that people are confronted with (Study 2.2). In line with these behavioral inclinations,
dispositional benign envy is linked to hope for success, whereas dispositional malicious envy
is linked to fear of failure and decreased hope for success (Study 2.3). Moreover, these mo-
tivational dynamics translate into performance patterns of long-distance runners mediated via
increased goal setting for dispositional benign envy. The propensity to experience malicious
envy can even be associated with the active disengagement of concrete goals (Study 2.4).
The current data highlight that the BeMaS allows to uncover previously unknown moti-
vational dynamics of envy. In Study 2.4, dispositional malicious envy predicted the active
disengagement of a concrete race goal of long-distance runners. This fits the results of Study
2.3, which showed that dispositional malicious envy is linked to a fear of not living up to a
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certain standard of excellence and decreased hope to reach it. It follows that dispositional
malicious envy may also be an important predictor of motivational behavior in other settings
and be related to other specific forms of coping strategies that fit this motivational dynamic.
For instance, people prone to malicious envy may often actively deny the goal to get good
grades in an educational situation, or disidentify with the goal to pursue a better position in
the company. They may also be more likely to switch to other comparison domains to bol-
ster their self-esteem, or they may engage in self-handicapping. This reflects a pattern of a
self-protection strategy (rather than a self-enhancement strategy) in responding to self-esteem
threat evoked by upward social comparisons (cf. Hepper, Gramzow, & Sedikides, 2010).
Furthermore, translated versions of the BeMaS may be an interesting means to test cultural
differences of dispositional benign and malicious envy and how they relate to other psycho-
logical constructs. There is not yet much research on cultural variations in envious responding
(but see Foster, 1972) and we are not aware of such research under the umbrella of benign
and malicious envy. In Eastern cultures, people tend to construe the self as interdependent
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Given that such a self-construal leads under some circumstances
to stronger assimilation effects (Kühnen & Hannover, 2000), we would predict more benign
envy. Nevertheless, Eastern cultures often instill stable social hierarchies and demand to re-
spect these fixed status differences (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010). This could de-
crease felt personal control over one’s outcomes, which would then increase malicious envy
(Van de Ven et al., 2011a). Such hypotheses could easily be tested with the BeMaS.
The studies presented above are strongly focused on the motivational dynamics of dispo-
sitional envy. We see this as a central dimension of envious responding. Nevertheless, we
are optimistic that the BeMaS can also help to predict distinct relationships of the different
envy forms with other important personality characteristics and important psychological out-
comes. For instance, it has been shown that dispositional envy is related to all three elements
of the Dark Triad (Veselka et al., 2014). As Veselka et al.’s scale presumably taps into dispo-
sitional malicious envy, it remains to be investigated how dispositional benign envy is related
to Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy. We predict benign envy to be positively
related to Machiavellianism and narcissism but not to psychopathy (Lange, Hagemeyer, &
Crusius, 2015). Benign envy results from an appraisal of control over personal outcomes (Van
de Ven et al., 2011a) which might, in excess, lead to a grandiose view on the self and therefore
to narcissism (Lange, Crusius, & Hagemeyer, 2015). Furthermore, benign envy is character-
ized by strong frustration and negative affect (e.g., Crusius & Lange, 2014). Its central goal is
to overcome this frustration by leveling up. Possibly, in the extreme, the benignly envious are
inclined to use every means to attain this superior level of achievement, even if they have to
resort to trickery and manipulation characterizing Machiavellianism. In summary, confidence
in the self and a willingness to stop at nothing to level up in concert with hope for success
should protect the benignly envious individual from negative affect in the long run and thus,
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from psychopathy. In contrast, we would predict dispositional malicious envy to be related to
Machiavellianism and psychopathy as measured within the Dark Triad. Malicious envy entails
hostile behaviors directed at the envied person (e.g., Duffy et al., 2012; Moran & Schweitzer,
2008), which could underlie a manipulative mind. These hostile behaviors in concert with
resentful thoughts might eventually lead into subclinical psychopathic thoughts (see, for in-
stance, Gold, 1996).
2.10 Conclusion
For a long time, there has been agreement about the hostile nature of envy. Recent find-
ings, however, cast doubt on this one-dimensional picture of envious responding. Next to the
socially destructive behaviors that characterize malicious envy, the benign form of envy can
also lead to upward-directed behavior. In the present article, we conceptualized and measured
envy as a two-dimensional personality trait. This enabled us to link dispositional malicious
and benign envy to distinct pessimistic and optimistic motivational tendencies and, ultimately,
to behavior. We are confident that taking the dual nature of envy into account will uncover the
wide variety of motivational dynamics and behavioral consequences of the most joyless of all
sins.
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3. Chapter 3 — The Tango of Two Deadly Sins
Abstract
Envy stems from a social comparison with a superior standard. Its 2 distinct forms are di-
rected at changing this situation in different ways, either by becoming as successful as the
envied person (in benign envy) or by lowering the envied person’s advantage (in malicious
envy). In essence, envy is thus a social phenomenon. Nevertheless, most previous research
has focused on its underlying intrapersonal processes, overlooking envy’s interpersonal core.
In contrast, we show in 6 studies (N = 1,513) that envy and pride are intertwined in a social-
functional relationship. Envy and pride often co-occur (Study 3.1) and pride displays enhance
envious feelings (Studies 3.2 and 3.3). Specifically, authentic (success attributed to effort) and
hubristic pride (success attributed to talent) modulate envious intentions and behavior toward
their benign and malicious form (Study 3.2 to 3.6). This effect is mediated via liking, per-
ceived prestige, and perceived dominance (Study 3.4). In accordance with a social-functional
approach, the effects emerge only when authentic and hubristic pride are expressed by the su-
perior person and not when the respective information about the superior person’s feelings is
simply available in the environment (Study 3.5). These effects are present when participants
recall envy situations (Study 3.1), when they imagine being in a competitive situation (Studies
3.3, 3.4, and 3.5), or when envy is elicited in situ (Studies 3.2 and 3.6). Our findings show the
value of studying envy as a social phenomenon and open up numerous avenues for research
on envy at the interpersonal and intergroup level.
„[James Hunt] was among the very few I liked and even fewer that I respected. He re-
mains the only person I envied.“
—Formula One driver Niki Lauda about his competitor James Hunt in the dramatization of
their rivalry in the movie Rush (Fellner et al., 2013)
For better or worse, competition can unleash enormous motivational forces. When Niki
Lauda competed against James Hunt as a top contender for the 1976 Formula One world
championship, a fierce and long-lasting rivalry had reached its apex. In the middle of the
season, a near-fatal racing accident inflicted severe burns and damaged lungs upon Lauda,
barely allowing him to breathe. Nevertheless, merely 6 weeks later and still suffering from
pain and injury, he returned to the contest to preserve a small remaining chance of winning the
drivers’ championship. When does being outperformed propel people to attain and surpass the
superior achievements of others? When does it lead to hostile behavior aimed at harming the
outcome of others? In the present work, we investigate how the interaction of winners’ and
losers’ social emotions shapes motivation and behavior in competitive situations.
Whether people compete for athletic achievements, the best grade in an exam, or for their
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dream job, they are readily informed about their competitors’ successes based on the emotions
these people have. The central emotion people express after success in competitions is pride
(Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008). They may show unrestrained joy over the precious gold medal,
boast with an excellent grade, or announce a new job on Facebook. Pride has been damned
by many and even been called the queen of all Catholic deadly sins (Baasten, 1986). Yet, psy-
chological research (Tracy & Robins, 2007a) supports a more multifaceted view on pride, also
finding virtue in this emotion. As sinful as showing off might be, if pride follows from merit,
it is an expression of deserved status. Thus, pride can draw attention to a superior person,
either as a telltale sign of an exaggerated ego or as an admirable expression of accomplished
achievement. As such, a pride display should be a powerful signal to the outperformed.
The strongest and most prevalent emotional consequence of perceiving superior competi-
tors is envy (Smith & Kim, 2007). It, too, is often regarded to be a vicious emotion, the deadly
and most joyless of all sins (Aquaro, 2004). In parallel to pride, research also attests a more
multifaceted nature to envy. On the one hand, envy is a powerful motivator that may cause
socially harmful behavior. On the other hand, it may also increase the desire to move up-
ward (Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2009). Nevertheless, in stark contrast to its societal
recognition and its strong motivational impact, many questions about envy still await empiri-
cal scrutiny (Smith & Kim, 2007). Particularly, despite envy’s quintessentially social nature,
the active role of the envied person in the elicitation of envy has not been investigated yet.
Here, we propose that envy and pride are intertwined in a social-functional relationship.
We predict envy to be a pivotal response to a superior individual’s pride display. We show
how pride and envy shape distinct pathways in responding to victory and defeat—the tango of
two deadly sins.
3.1 Benign and Malicious Envy
Envy is a negative emotional response to a situation in which someone lacks another’s
superior quality, achievement, or possession and either desires it or wishes the other lacks it
(Parrott & Smith, 1993; Smith & Kim, 2007). Recent research has revealed that envy is not a
unitary reaction to such upward social comparisons (Belk, 2011; Chapter 2; Crusius & Lange,
2014; Van de Ven et al., 2009; Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2011a, 2011b) but manifests
in two distinct forms: benign and malicious envy. Next to its malicious manifestation, a form
of envy exists that spurs the desire to attain the other’s advantage (Crusius & Mussweiler,
2012) but does not entail hostility. This dual character of envy is mirrored in the fact that
the lexicon of many languages contains two words for envy mapping onto this distinction.
For instance, the German words beneiden and missgönnen both translate into the English (to)
envy. Similar distinctions exist in Dutch (benijden and afgunst), Arabic (ghibtah and hasad),
or Russian (white and black envy). Yet, even in languages having only one word for envy, such
Jens Lange The elicitation of envy 33
as English or Spanish, people also recall two different clusters of emotional experiences that
correspond to benign and malicious envy (Van de Ven et al., 2009).
How are these forms of envy different from each other? Both are equally negative and
frustrating (e.g., Chapter 2; Crusius & Lange, 2014) but involve distinct patterns of cognition
and behavior. Benign envy entails more positive thoughts about the envied person (Van de
Ven et al., 2009), is associated with increased effort (Chapter 2; Van de Ven et al., 2011a), a
desire to get the other’s advantage (Crusius & Mussweiler, 2012; Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, &
Pieters, 2011b), and an attentional shift toward means to attain the upward goal (Crusius &
Lange, 2014). Malicious envy, in contrast, entails negative thoughts about the envied person
(Van de Ven et al., 2009), Schadenfreude at the other’s suffering (Van de Ven et al., 2015;
see also Smith et al., 1996; Van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, Goslinga, Nieweg, & Gallucci, 2006), and
an attentional shift toward the envied person relative to the envy object (Crusius & Lange,
2014; see also Hill, DelPriore, & Vaughan, 2011). Presumably, it is also the driver of other
socially destructive consequences attributed to envy such as hostile and resentful thoughts
toward the envied person (Salovey & Rodin, 1984; Smith, Parrott, Ozer, & Moniz, 1994),
social undermining in groups (Duffy, Scott, Shaw, Tepper, & Aquino, 2012), and cheating
(Moran & Schweitzer, 2008).
The distinct consequences of benign and malicious envy are in line with an evolutionary
perspective according to which envy is an adaptive emotional response to an environmental
challenge (Hill & Buss, 2008; Hill et al., 2011). Envy not only alerts an envier to another’s
advantage, it also motivates to level the difference between the self and the superior standard
(Van de Ven et al., 2009). To do so, the envier can either try to increase personal effort in order
to level up and become as successful as the envied person or the envier can damage the other’s
success and thereby level the envied person down.7
When is envy elicited and when will it develop into its benign or malicious form? It has
been shown that the envier must perceive the envied person as similar to the self (Schaubroeck
& Lam, 2004). In addition, envy typically occurs in domains of high personal relevance (Del-
Priore, Hill, & Buss, 2012; Salovey & Rodin, 1984). These prerequisites are also found in
research on the amplification of social comparisons in general (e.g., Corcoran, Crusius, &
Mussweiler, 2011). They determine whether specific individuals may become focal compari-
7As benign and malicious envy are neither linked to distinct words across all languages nor specific facial
expressions, separate physiological changes, or differences in associated affect, their respective motivational
tendencies are a key distinction between the two forms. Therefore, measures of benign and malicious envy
often refer to motivational proclivities associated with their specific environmental challenge (e.g., Baumel
& Berant, 2015; Chapter 2; Crusius & Lange, 2014; Van de Ven et al., 2009, 2011a). These motivational
proclivities are also what distinguishes benign envy from its neighboring emotion of admiration, which is
unrelated to increased improvement behavior. Furthermore, the latter does not necessarily entail a comparison
to the other person. In addition, even though people who are benignly envious admire the superior other to
some extent, pure admiration is a positive emotion (Crusius & Lange, 2014; Immordino-Yang, McColl,
Damasio, & Damasio, 2009; Van de Ven et al., 2009).
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son standards for the envier. Such a situation develops into benign envy if the envier appraises
the other’s advantage as deserved and evaluates control over personal outcomes as high. It
develops into malicious envy if the envier appraises the other’s advantage as undeserved and
evaluates control over personal outcomes as low (Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2012).
These appraisal patterns fit the notion that benign and malicious envy reflect different adaptive
responses to upward comparisons given particular situational affordances.
Reviewing the factors that have been investigated as determinants of envy, it is apparent
that they mainly focus on the envier. Perceived similarity, personal relevance, appraised de-
servingness, and experienced personal control are all constructs highlighting the cognitive and
experiential realm of the inferior person. However, envy is—by its very definition—a social
emotion. It involves (at least) a dyad of an envier and an envied person. An intrapersonal
approach tacitly shifts the research focus away from envy’s interpersonal essence. Here we
argue that, to understand envy, it is important to take its social nature more directly into ac-
count. We think of envy as a social-functional emotion, thus, as a response to another person’s
action. Specifically, we hypothesize that envy is fueled by displays of pride.
3.2 The Social-Functional Relation of Envy and Pride
According to social-functional approaches (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Fischer & Van
Kleef, 2010; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Manstead & Fischer, 2001), emotions have partly evolved
to support the formation and maintenance of relationships and to establish and maintain social
hierarchies. For instance, anger displays imply aggressive propensities and self-confidence
(Hareli & Hess, 2010). In negotiations, such inferences make people believe that the other
person has high limits, which leads them to concede more (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead,
2004, for similar findings with other emotions, see Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2006;
Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Van Kleef, 2013). As another example, expressed em-
barrassment signals appeasement and prosociality to others, which fosters trust and affiliative
tendencies on the side of observers (Feinberg, Willer, & Keltner, 2012; Keltner, 1995). These
examples show that emotions affect others by conveying important social information.
In order to infer the social function of a particular emotion, it is crucial to determine the
social goal it serves (Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). As outlined above, the social goal
of envy is to level the difference between the self and the envied person. More specifically,
when people experience benign envy, they try to level themselves up, whereas when they
experience malicious envy they try to level the other down. If another individual has gained
higher status, envy helps to reestablish a similar status for the self or to even surpass the envied
person. Given envy’s social goal, it follows that envy should be fueled by a superior person’s
emotional display of higher status.
The most likely emotional communication of status to others in a competitive environment
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is through pride (Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010; Martens, Tracy, & Shariff, 2012; Oveis,
Horberg, & Keltner, 2010; Shariff & Tracy, 2009; Shariff, Tracy, & Markusoff, 2012; Tracy,
Shariff, Zhao, & Henrich, 2013). It occurs if a person attributes a success internally (Horberg,
Kraus, & Keltner, 2013; Tracy & Robins, 2004a; Tracy, Shariff, & Cheng, 2010; Williams &
DeSteno, 2008). Pride is spontaneously expressed in response to victory (Tracy & Matsumoto,
2008), and has multiple distinctive expressions (verbal and visual; Tracy & Prehn, 2012; Tracy
& Robins, 2004b) recognized across cultures (Tracy & Robins, 2008; Tracy et al., 2013).
Depending on how a successful person attributes achievement, pride can develop into one
of two forms. Attributing success to internal, unstable, controllable causes leads to authentic
pride. Attributing success to internal, stable, uncontrollable causes leads to hubristic pride
(Tracy & Robins, 2007a). For instance, after receiving an excellent grade in an exam, a student
might be proud because of effort invested into studying (authentic pride) or personal abilities
(hubristic pride). Yet, why should these expressions of pride affect envy on the side of the
inferior person?
In accordance with a social approach to emotions (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Van Kleef, 2009;
Van Kleef, Van Doorn, Heerdink, & Koning, 2011), pride should convey specific thoughts and
intentions to observers. More specifically, it reveals the superiority of the pride displaying in-
dividual and signals the relevance of an achievement, which are requirements for envy (Smith
& Kim, 2007). Thus, we hypothesize that pride contributes to the elicitation of envy. In ad-
dition, we argue that there are distinct relationships between expressed authentic pride and
benign envy as well as expressed hubristic pride and malicious envy.
People expressing authentic pride are perceived as prestigious and respectable individuals
from whom others may receive valuable information (Cheng et al., 2010). Authentic pride
also increases perceived likability (Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 2013).
Therefore, authentic pride expressions should foster benign envy, entailing the motivation to
level the difference by increasing effort. This hypothesis is in line with research showing that
subjective personal control and appraised deservingness spur benign envy (Lange, Crusius, &
Hagemeyer, 2015; Van de Ven et al., 2012). In contrast, people expressing hubristic pride are
perceived as individuals who try to secure their status by dominating and controlling others
(Cheng et al., 2010). This undermines their likability (Cheng et al., 2013). Therefore, hubris-
tic pride expressions should foster malicious envy, entailing the envier’s motivation to harm
the superior position of the envied person. This hypothesis is in line with research showing
that reduced personal control and decreased appraisals of deservingness spur malicious envy
(Lange et al., 2015; Van de Ven et al., 2012).
On the surface, our theoretical account may seem contradictory to research on the effect
of dominance displays on perceivers’ submissiveness. For example, if individuals expand
their posture in interactions, perceivers may show complementary reactions by constricting
themselves (Tiedens & Fragale, 2003). Such submissive reactions can be accompanied by de-
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pressive feelings (Price, 1998) or shame (Gilbert, 2000). Thus, displays related to pride may
sometimes lead to the acceptance of a hierarchy. Nevertheless, these findings do not speak
against our hypotheses. The desire for status is a fundamental human motive, yet it varies
between situations (Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015). Competitive situations fulfill
certain criteria that lead to the refusal of status differences (Price, 1998; Tiedens & Fragale,
2003). First, the desired object or domain of comparison is of high value to the inferior person.
Second, the pursued path to level the difference is under voluntary control. Finally, the hier-
archical differences are often not established before the competition starts but are determined
by the result of the competition itself. Thus, even if pride displays may foster submissive
reactions in noncompetitive situations, such an acceptance of the status quo is unlikely in
competitive settings. The latter are the focus of our investigation.
3.3 The Current Research
In summary, we theorize that there is a social-functional relation between envy and pride.
Specifically, pride’s social goal of status enhancement should foster an envious response to
close the resulting gap in perceived status. However, this can occur via two different routes.
Authentic pride should modulate an envier’s feelings toward benign envy and its motivational
tendency to level up. Hubristic pride should modulate an envier’s feelings toward malicious
envy and its motivational tendency to harm the other’s success. We investigated these predic-
tions in six studies.
3.4 Study 3.1
Study 3.1 had two goals. First, we investigated how often envy and pride co-occur. Sec-
ond, we examined the potential relationship between authentic pride and benign envy as well
as hubristic pride and malicious envy. For these aims, we asked participants to recall an inci-
dent of either benign or malicious envy, to rate the envied person with regard to authentic and
hubristic pride, and to indicate whether the envied person had displayed pride.
3.4.1 Method.
Participants. One hundred thirty-one8 U.S. citizens from Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk)
participated in Study 3.1. Based on criteria set a priori, we excluded participants who indi-
cated we should not use their data (n = 2; Meade & Craig, 2012) and who did not recall an
8The sample sizes of all studies were planned with G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) or based
on sample size recommendations for mediation analyses (Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007) for a small to medium
effect size and the aim to achieve 80% power.
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envy incident (n= 7). Thus, the final sample size was N = 122 with a mean age of 35.07 years
(SD = 12.55). Fifty-one of them were male (one missing value).
Materials and procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions:
They either recalled an incident of benign (n = 66) or malicious envy (n = 56). Specifically,
participants’ task was to recall an incident of envy in which they evaluated the other’s advan-
tage as deserved or undeserved. Deservingness is one of the key appraisal dimensions that
differentiates between benign and malicious envy (e.g., Crusius & Lange, 2014; Van de Ven
et al., 2012). Participants were further instructed to close their eyes and vividly reexperience
what happened and how they felt. Then, they should write down the story in as much detail as
possible as if they would tell it to a good friend (Roseman et al., 1994).
Afterward, participants answered manipulation check questions adapted from Van de Ven
et al. (2009) and validated by Crusius and Lange (2014). We instructed them that we would
refer to the envied person as the person and to the envied person’s advantage as X. The manip-
ulation check included seven items related to benign envy (e.g., „I felt inspired to also obtain
X“; α= .64), seven items related to malicious envy (e.g., „I would have liked to hurt the per-
son“; α = .91), three items related to the intensity of negative affect (e.g., „It felt frustrating
that I did not have X“; α = .76), and three items related to deservingness (e.g., „The person
didn’t deserve X,“ reverse coded; α = .86). Participants responded by using a scale from 1
(does not apply at all) to 7 (applies very much). The items can be found in Appendix B (Table
B1).
Then, we instructed participants to indicate how they thought the envied person had felt.
They did so on a scale measuring authentic and hubristic pride (Tracy & Robins, 2007a). Par-
ticipants indicated how strongly the other person appeared to feel accomplished, like he or she
is achieving, confident, fulfilled, productive, like he or she has self-worth, and successful (au-
thentic pride; α = .91) as well as arrogant, conceited, egotistical, pompous, smug, snobbish,
and stuck-up (hubristic pride; α = .97). Answers were given on a scale from 1 (not at all) to
5 (extremely).
Finally, participants responded with yes or no to the question „Did you notice or hear of
any occurrence of pride on the side of the person you envied in relation to his/her advantage?“
3.4.2 Results.
Manipulation check. Based on the theoretical conceptualization of benign and malicious
envy, we predicted higher values for the benign envy condition than the malicious envy con-
dition on the benign envy scale and the reversed pattern for the malicious envy scale. We
expected no differences with regard to the intensity of negative affect. However, in the benign
envy condition, the envied person’s advantage should be rated as more deserved. We ana-
lyzed responses to the manipulation check items in a MANOVA with envy condition (benign
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vs. malicious) as independent variable and benign envy, malicious envy, intensity of negative
affect, and deservingness scales as dependent variables. Descriptive and inferential statistics
can be found in Table 3.1.9
The analysis revealed a multivariate effect of envy condition, F(4, 117) = 27.57, p <
.001,η2p = .49. As predicted, the benign envy condition had higher values on the benign envy
scale than the malicious envy condition. For the malicious envy scale, the benign envy condi-
tion had lower values than the malicious envy condition. There was no difference between the
benign and the malicious envy condition regarding the intensity of negative affect. However,
in the former participants appraised the other person’s advantage to be more deserved than in
the latter. Thus, the manipulation of benign and malicious envy was effective.
Table 3.1. Descriptive and Inferential Statistics for the Manipulation Check of Study 3.1.
Variable MBenign (SD) MMalicious (SD) F(1, 120) p η2p
Benign Envy 5.20 (0.95) 4.44 (1.06) 17.25 < .001 .13
Malicious Envy 2.22 (1.42) 3.69 (1.54) 29.84 < .001 .29
Intensitity of Negative Affect 4.93 (1.55) 5.30 (1.34) 2 .21 .02
Deservingness 5.27 (1.66) 2.40 (1.49) 99.37 < .001 .45
Note. Answers were given on a scale from 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (applies very much).
Pride. We hypothesized that pride would occur frequently and equally often in benign
and malicious envy situations. This is a prerequisite for our more specific predictions. In
total, 56% of all participants indicated that the envied person openly displayed pride with
no difference between the benign (53%) and the malicious envy conditions (59%), χ2(1) =
0.43, p = .51.
In addition, authentic pride should be more prevalent in benign than in malicious envy
episodes, whereas the reverse should be true for hubristic pride. To test this hypothesis, we
conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA with envy condition (benign vs. malicious) and scale
(authentic vs. hubristic) as independent variables with repeated-measures on the last factor.
The results are depicted in Figure 3.1. The analysis revealed main effects of envy condi-
tion, F(1, 120) = 7.78, p = .01, η2p = .06, and scale, F(1, 120) = 120.19, p < .001, η
2
p = .50,
that were qualified by our predicted interaction, F(1, 120) = 23.22, p < .001, η2p = .16. Al-
though descriptively there was more authentic pride in the benign (M = 4.09, SD = 0.86)
than in the malicious envy condition (M = 3.90, SD = 0.88), this effect was not significant,
F(1, 120) = 1.41, p = .24, η2p = .01. However, hubristic pride was significantly lower in the
9Correlations among all measures for Studies 3.1 to 3.4 and central measures of Study 3.6 can be found in
Appendix B (Tables B2, B3, B5, B7, and B8).
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benign (M = 2.16, SD = 1.20) than in the malicious envy condition (M = 3.15, SD = 1.18),
F(1, 120) = 21.1, p < .001, η2p = .15.
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Figure 3.1. Effects of benign and malicious envy on authentic and hubristic pride ratings in
Study 3.1. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean.
3.4.3 Discussion.
Study 1 provides initial evidence in line with our predictions. More than half of the par-
ticipants indicated that the envied person displayed pride independent of the type of envy sit-
uation. Thus, as hypothesized, pride and envy frequently co-occur and might therefore affect
each other. In accordance with this notion, in the benign envy condition, participants descrip-
tively perceived the envied person’s pride to be more authentic. In contrast, in the malicious
envy condition, participants perceived the envied person’s pride to be more hubristic. Note
that benign envy was overall more strongly endorsed than malicious envy and authentic pride
more so than hubristic pride. This is likely the case because malicious envy and hubristic pride
are more socially undesirable and therefore more difficult to agree to. However, this does not
affect the conclusions as our predictions focused on comparisons of authentic and hubristic
pride between the two envy conditions.
In sum, pride seems to be relevant in envy situations. But does it also have incremental
value in explaining envious reactions? In particular, can a pride display of another person
increase envy and modulate it toward its different forms? To answer these questions, we ma-
nipulated pride in the following experiments using a diverse set of methodological approaches.
Jens Lange The elicitation of envy 40
In Study 2, we took advantage of the fact that pride displays can be ambiguous with regard
to their potential to convey either authentic or hubristic pride (Tracy & Robins, 2007b). This
allowed us to test whether such a display would increase envy (compared with a neutral con-
trol condition). Furthermore, it allowed to collect correlational evidence on the relationship
of the perceived pride forms with benign and malicious envy—depending on how perceivers
disambiguated the pride expression spontaneously in a naturalistic situation.
3.5 Study 3.2
In Study 3.2, we examined whether a superior person’s pride display contributes to envi-
ous feelings and behavioral intentions above and beyond mere high achievement. To do so,
we manipulated whether a confederate who won a competition with the participant displayed
pride or no specific emotion. We confronted participants with an ambiguous pride display that
can either be perceived as authentic or hubristic pride. We measured the amount of envy that
participants experienced as well as their resulting behavioral intentions. We also asked for the
specific type of pride perceived by them to test whether authentic pride modulates envy more
toward benign intentions than hubristic pride. We expected the reversed pattern for malicious
intentions. Because, objectively, the participants were always outperformed by the confeder-
ate in the same way, any difference between the pride and control condition can be attributed
only to the presence of pride and not simply to high achievement.
3.5.1 Method.
Participants. One hundred twenty-seven university students participated in Study 3.2.
They were compensated with a choice among various snacks. In this study, we did not include
several demographic questions less relevant for research with students (e.g., education) and
the items for the exclusion criteria (questions from Meade & Craig, 2012) used in the other
studies. This was done to keep the study within the narrow time constraints of the research lab.
However, we a priori decided to exclude non-native speakers (n = 7). Our elicitation of envy
relied on a language-based achievement task in which participants had to identify the longest
word in an anagram. It was necessary to make this task rather difficult and the best solution
hard to find even for native speakers. We therefore suspected that non-native speakers would
not see the confederate as a relevant comparison standard, which is a precondition for envy
(e.g., Schaubroeck & Lam, 2004). Hence, the final sample included 120 participants with a
mean age of 22.4 years (SD = 3.07). Forty of them were male.
Materials and procedure. The experimenter approached participants in a crowded hallway
inviting them to a study investigating the effect of competitive situations on achievement. After
recruiting the participant, the experimenter ostensibly approached another participant who ac-
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tually was a gender-matched confederate sitting in the hallway looking at her/his smartphone.
In total, we had three female and two male confederates. The experimenter was always the
same female research assistant. She guided both the participant and the confederate to the lab.
The confederate was instructed to not interact with the participant. If the participant would
initiate any conversation, the confederate should reply with a neutral tone and short sentences.
In the lab, the experimenter stood behind a lectern and asked the confederate to position
her- or himself left to a table in front of her and the participant right to it. Both were then
introduced to the anagram task. In the task, participants had to generate the longest word they
could find using all or a subset of the letters from a string (Crusius & Mussweiler, 2011).
The string was presented on a sheet of paper attached to a board and they had 30 s to write
down their solution on a small sheet of paper on a clipboard. The person with the longest
word would receive one point. The person with the highest number of points would win the
respective round. Participants expected to play two rounds of the game. This was necessary
for the content of the dependent measures, which participants completed after the first round.
However, we stopped after the first round.
As an incentive, each person could earn one of several attractive snacks (several fruits and
chocolate bars) as a reward, if this person had won one round. The experimenter always asked
the participant to choose first what s/he would like to have as a possible reward. To increase the
potential intensity of envy, our confederate always chose the same reward as the participant.
Subsequently, there were one practice trial and four critical trials in Round 1. In fact, the
competition was rigged. Participants always won the practice trial and the first trial. After-
ward, the confederate won the last three trials, and, as a consequence, surpassed the participant
in Trial 3 and finally won in Trial 4. This was ensured as follows. The letter strings were rather
long. They always allowed multiple solutions of various lengths. However, there was only one
solution with all letters, which was extremely difficult to find. For example, one of the letter
strings was tesnhmyhreac. The corresponding solution including all letters was Chrysantheme
(chrysanthemum). Nevertheless, there were always more than 32 possible solutions of differ-
ent lengths, such that each participant would always find a solution.
The experimenter had a list on her lectern enumerating all the possible solutions for each
letter string. The list could not be seen from the participants’ spot. At the end of each trial, she
collected the sheets from the participant and the confederate and then also took them with her
to the lectern. Although the confederate was instructed to always write down something on the
sheet after a reasonable amount of time, her/his sheet was not considered by the experimenter.
Actually, she would look at the participant’s solution and quickly browse through her list in
order to find a shorter (practice trial and Trial 1) or longer solution (Trials 2 to 4) and finally
reading them out aloud. The respective winner was given a point marked on the board. As
participants never found the longest word, we always had the opportunity to let the confederate
excel them. At the end of Round 1, the confederate took the reward from the table right in
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front of the participant.
We randomly allocated participants to two different conditions, varying the emotional dis-
play of the confederate. In the neutral condition (n = 61), the confederate would behave
neutrally without emotional change during the competition. In the pride condition (n = 59),
the confederate expressed pride twice, once after s/he had surpassed the participant in Trial 3
and for a second time after winning in Trial 4. The first pride display was a single fist with the
right hand and a bent arm. The second pride display was expressed by raising both arms and
fists, expanded posture, head tilted backward, and a slight smile (Tracy & Robins, 2004b). The
confederate also strengthened both displays by simultaneously exclaiming „Yes!“ (see Figure
3.2; demonstration videos are available online http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000026.supp).
Figure 3.2. Screenshots from videos of a female actor displaying the single fist pride display
(left panel) and a male actor displaying the double fist pride display (right panel) as used in
Study 3.2.
We pretested three pride displays, the two from the main study (single fist, n = 42, and
double fist, n = 45) and a third one with hands in hips (called hands akimbo, n = 26), head
tilted backward, expanded posture, and a slight smile (Tracy & Robins, 2004b) with native
speakers from the same population (N = 113). Participants imagined being in the situation
from the main study, namely that they participate and lose in a competition regarding vo-
cabulary and creativity. Then, they saw videos of gender-matched research assistants pos-
ing each display and indicated what they thought was the displayed emotion: happiness,
pride, shame, or no emotion (Tracy & Robins, 2004b). Afterward, they chose among three
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options whether they thought the person in the video felt accomplished, achieving, confi-
dent, fulfilled, productive, had self-worth, and felt successful (authentic pride), arrogant,
conceited, egotistical, pompous, smug, snobbish, and stuck-up (hubristic pride), or felt nei-
ther of these (Tracy & Prehn, 2012). Finally, participants indicated how realistic and cred-
ible they think such a display would be in this situation on a scale from 1 to 4, with high
ratings corresponding to high realism and credibility. The latter two ratings were highly
correlated, r(113) = .76, p < .001, and therefore collapsed as a rating of appropriateness.
All three displays were rated equally highly as expressing pride, p(pride|single fist) = .86,
p(pride|double fist) = .80, p(pride|hands akimbo) = .92, χ2(2) = 1.98, p = .37. However,
the single fist, p(authentic) = .50, p(hubristic) = .43, and the double fist, p(authentic) = .53,
p(Hubristic) = .44, were equally likely in being perceived as authentic or hubristic pride,
whereas hands akimbo was biased toward hubristic pride, p(authentic) = .04, p(hubristic)
= .89, χ2(4) = 20.13, p < .001. Additionally, regarding their appropriateness, the single fist
(M = 2.61, SD = 0.82) and the double fist (M = 2.38, SD = 0.77) were seen as more appro-
priate than hands akimbo (M = 1.96, SD = 0.63), both ps < .08, whereas the former two did
not differ, p = .34. This resulted in a main effect of display on appropriateness ratings in a
univariate ANOVA, F(2, 110) = 5.78, p= .004, η2p = .10. As we were interested in using dis-
plays that were perceived as pride expressions and that were equally likely to be interpreted as
authentic or hubristic pride and nevertheless appropriate, we chose the single fist and double
fist for the main study.
In the main study, after losing against the confederate, the experimenter announced that
the participant should now complete a short questionnaire before the alleged second round.
The questionnaire measured our focal dependent variables. They were completed at two sep-
arate desks, one for the confederate and one for the participant. Both were separated by a
partition. The experimenter stayed behind her lectern. Confederates received a questionnaire
stating „For the winner“ and participants received a questionnaire stating „For the second
winner.“ We included two filler questions about the participants’ subjective feelings of time
pressure and stress to mask the aim of our study. As dependent variables, participants indi-
cated how they thought the other person felt using the item from the pretest for authentic and
hubristic pride. Then, participants reported how envious they were of the confederate. For
this item we used the German adjective neidisch, which, as its English translation envious, en-
compasses both the benign and the malicious form of envy. Finally, we measured benign and
malicious intentions with items capturing the motivational dynamics associated with the two
forms. Specifically, we directly adapted all items from Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, and Pieters
(2012; Study 2). Two items measured benign envy („I feel inspired to do my best in Round 2“
and „I am motivated to exert more effort in Round 2“; rs = .80, p < .001) and two other items
measured malicious envy („I would like to gossip about the other person“ and „I wish that the
other person performs worse in round 2“; rs = .16, p = .08). The low correlation among the
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malicious envy items was unexpected as this was not the case in Van de Ven et al. (2012) and
Studies 3.3 and 3.4 in which we used similar items. However, based on the conceptualization
of envy and our a priori analysis plan, we nevertheless averaged them. To account for their low
correlation, we also ran all analyses with the individual items and report when results differ
for them. All responses were given on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).
Finally, participants were debriefed and compensated with the snack they had initially cho-
sen as potential reward. No participant indicated that s/he was suspicious about the veracity
of the study.
3.5.2 Results.
Manipulation check. We predicted that participants perceived higher authentic and hubris-
tic pride expressed by their competitor in the pride condition compared with the neutral con-
dition. Authentic and hubristic pride should be equally distributed across the pride condition
as they were in our pretest. We used a χ2-test with display condition (pride vs. neutral) as
independent variable and pride perception (authentic pride vs. hubristic pride vs. neutral) as
dependent variable to test whether our manipulation was successful.
In the pride condition, authentic pride was perceived in 59% of the cases, hubristic pride
was perceived in 19% of the cases, and participants perceived no emotion in 22% of the cases.
In the neutral condition, the respective values were 48% for authentic pride, 3% for hubristic
pride, and 49% for no emotion. This overall difference was significant, χ2(2) = 13.49, p =
.001. Thus, our manipulation was successful but not ideal. Unexpectedly, some participants
interpreted the confederate’s feelings as authentic pride even in the absence of any emotion
display. This might have happened because the confederate always won the competition lead-
ing participants to infer prestige and correspondingly authentic pride (Cheng et al., 2010) even
in the absence of a display. Furthermore, in contrast to the pretest, authentic pride was more
frequently perceived than hubristic pride (p < .001). One explanation might be that the im-
personal situation in the pretest did not invoke as much social desirability concerns compared
to the main study. Nevertheless, and most importantly, pride was perceived more often in
the experimental condition than in the neutral condition, which is the crucial prerequisite for
testing pride’s effect on envy.
Effect of pride on envy. We reasoned that a pride display upon success represents an
expression of status enhancement, which, if perceived by the inferior person, will intensify
envy. This was indeed the case. Descriptive and inferential statistics can be found in Table
3.2. In the pride condition, participants were more envious than in the neutral condition.10
10If participants who did not perceive pride in the pride condition are excluded from the analyses, the pride
condition (M = 2.50, SD = 1.44) also leads to more envy than the neutral condition (M = 1.98, SD = 1.07),
F(1, 105) = 4.52, p = .04,η2p = .04.
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Furthermore, we expected pride to spur benignly envious and maliciously envious inten-
tions. In line with this prediction, pride displays elicited more malicious envy compared with
the neutral display. However, the pride condition did not result in higher ratings on benign
envy than the neutral condition.
Table 3.2. Descriptive and Inferential Statistics for the Effect of Display Condition on Envy
in Study 3.2.
Variable MPride (SD) MNeutral (SD) F(1, 118) p η2p
General Envy 2.44 (1.48) 1.98 (1.07) 3.78 .054 .03
Benign Envy 4.37 (1.72) 4.48 (1.63) 0.11 .74 .001
Malicious Envy 2.69 (1.20) 2.11 (1.03) 8.12 .01 .06
Note. Answers were given on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).
When interpreting these effects, it is important to keep in mind that the tests for the effects
of display condition on benign and malicious intentions are very conservative. According to
our reasoning, authentic pride should modulate envy more toward benignly envious intentions
and hubristic pride should modulate envy more toward maliciously envious intentions. At the
same time, the pride condition should increase authentic and hubristic pride perceptions com-
pared with the neutral condition and therefore increase both, benign and malicious intentions.
Note that these two effects work against each other. Given that the control condition also led
to a fair amount of authentic pride perceptions, it was much harder for an effect on benign
envy to be revealed. We therefore also tested whether general envy mediates the effects of dis-
play condition on benign and malicious envy even in the absence of a direct effect for benign
envy. This can occur, if different effects cancel each other out (Hayes, 2009) as was likely
the case in our study. Our reasoning was that the general emotion term envious can be used
with respect to both benign envy and malicious envy. It should therefore link the effect of the
display condition to both of their respective motivational tendencies.
In a mediation analysis with 5,000 bootstrap resamples and bias-corrected confidence in-
terval (Preacher & Hayes, 2008), we found a mediation effect of display condition on be-
nign intentions via general envy, ab = −0.168, 95% CI [−0.457;−0.012]. The same anal-
ysis with malicious envy as dependent variable also revealed a significant mediation effect,
ab=−0.165, 95% CI [−0.362;−0.005].11 Thus, as predicted, pride displays fostered envy in
its benign and malicious form. The mediation effects are depicted in Figure 3.3.
11The mediation was not significant for the item related to gossiping, ab = −0.03, 95% CI [−0.13;0.03] but
only for the item related to wishes for worse performance, ab =−0.31, 95% CI [−0.69;−0.01].
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Display Condition Benign Envy
General Envy
0.46+ 0.37*
-0.10 (-0.11)
Display Condition Malicious Envy
General Envy
0.46+ 0.36*
0.41* (0.58*)
Figure 3.3. Mediation effects of display condition (1 = neutral, 2 = pride) on benign (upper
panel) and malicious envy intentions (lower panel) via general envy feelings in Study 3.2.
+p < .10. ∗p < .05.
In addition, we used the manipulation check as independent variable and compared par-
ticipants who perceived authentic pride in the confederate (n = 64) with participants who per-
ceived hubristic pride (n= 13). This constitutes a more direct, yet correlational test of our pre-
dictions. When participants perceived authentic pride, benignly envious intentions were higher
(M = 4.69, SD = 1.63) than when they perceived hubristic pride (M = 3.62, SD = 1.49),
F(1, 75) = 4.82, p = .03, η2p = .06. Conversely, when participants perceived authentic pride,
they were less likely to have maliciously envious intentions (M = 2.34, SD= 1.07) than when
they perceived hubristic pride in their opponent (M = 3.42, SD = 1.58), F(1, 75) = 9.22, p =
.003, η2p = .11.
12 Thus, again as predicted, authentic pride was associated with more benign
intentions and less malicious intentions than hubristic pride.
3.5.3 Discussion.
Study 3.2 shows the effect of pride on envy. Pride displays increased envy, thereby fos-
tering benign and malicious intentions. Furthermore, compared with perceptions of hubristic
pride, authentic pride was related to increased benign envy. This effect was reversed for mali-
12The effect was significant for the item related to gossiping (MAuthentic = 1.19, SD = 0.43; MHubristic =
3.38, SD= 2.02), t(12.22) =−3.90, p= .002 (Welch t-Test was chosen because of unequal variance correc-
tion), but not for the item related to wishes for worse performance (MAuthentic = 3.50, SD= 2.04; MHubristic =
3.46, SD = 2.07), F(1, 75) = 0.02, p = .95, η2p = .001.
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cious envy. A strength of the study is that we elicited envy in the lab, which is rarely done in
envy research. Participants were in direct contact with confederates displaying pride, ostensi-
bly in an actual competition.
However, the study also has limitations. Authentic and hubristic pride were not equally
distributed across conditions and participants also perceived a substantial amount of authentic
pride in the neutral condition. Presumably, this led to a nonsignificant effect of display condi-
tion on benign envy and very low power for testing the effects of authentic and hubristic pride
perceptions on benign and malicious envy. Furthermore, the items measuring malicious envy
were not strongly correlated. We think this was caused by a floor effect on these items. Al-
though we actively tried to create a neutral relationship of the confederates with participants,
they nevertheless seemed to like them. This is mirrored in their overwhelmingly authentic
pride perceptions. Thus, only a small number of participants endorsed high values on the
malicious items. Finally, the study allowed only a correlational test of the specific links of
authentic and hubristic pride with benign and malicious envy.
To address these limitations, we used videos and vignettes in the three subsequent studies
to directly manipulate whether actors displayed authentic or hubristic pride. When partic-
ipants imagine emotional situations, they are less likely to be guided by social desirability
concerns, but such studies nevertheless converge with results of real situations (Robinson &
Clore, 2001). In Study 3.3, we tested the effects of authentic and hubristic pride on benign
and malicious envy. Extending Study 3.2, we manipulated authentic and hubristic pride using
videos. Drawing on the results of Nelson and Russell (2014) and our pretest of Study 3.2, we
created pride videos depicting the face and the upper body.
Additionally, in Study 3.3 we included another control condition. The neutral condition in
Study 3.2 evoked quite some inferences of pride on the side of the confederate although pride
was never displayed. We think this was caused by the absence of any display, thereby foster-
ing inferences based on the situation (see above). Therefore, in Study 3.3, we included a fre-
quently expressed emotional display in response to success which reduces perceived status—
embarrassment (Shariff & Tracy, 2009).
3.6 Study 3.3
In Study 3.3, we tested whether authentic and hubristic pride distinctively increase benign
and malicious envy. Additionally we hypothesized that, as in Study 3.2, the pride forms would
lead to these effects above and beyond mere high achievement. To investigate this hypothesis,
we included another control condition in which the competitor displayed embarrassment fol-
lowing success.
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3.6.1 Method.
Participants. Three hundred seven students of a large German University participated in
Study 3. We excluded participants who indicated that we should not use their data (n = 6).
The final sample size was N = 301 with a mean age of 22.04 years (SD = 4.27; one missing
value). One hundred thirty participants were male.
Materials and procedure. In the instructions, we asked participants to imagine that they
attended a seminar in which they had to take exams repeatedly. They wanted to do well on
these exams and they seemed to do a good job in reaching this goal. But, very surprisingly, on
their midterm exam, their grade was much worse than they hoped it would be. Furthermore
they should imagine that, after all attendees had gotten their grade, they talked to another
attendee called Tina/Tim (matching the participant’s gender). Tina/Tim was among the best
on this exam and also generally among the best in the seminar. Participants imagined that
s/he was very happy about her/his result and that s/he had a grade that the participant would
like to have as well. Then we introduced our manipulation. We varied whether Tina/Tim
expressed authentic pride (n = 102), hubristic pride (n = 102), or embarrassment (n = 97)
about her/his success. To do so, we showed a video of a gender-matched person who displayed
the respective emotion.
The embarrassment display closely followed the expression described and validated by
Keltner (1995). Its central components are a controlled smile, downward head tilt followed
by movement to the side and finally up again, and touching the face. We integrated findings
from Tracy and Robins (2007b), Nelson and Russell (2014), and our own experiences to create
dynamic pride displays. The authentic pride display was similar to the single fist expression
from Study 3.2 but with a less aggressive facial display. Important components were the single
fist, an expanded posture, a slight smile, a gaze at the fist, and generally faster movement. The
hubristic pride display was similar to the hands akimbo expression from Study 3.2. Important
components were hands akimbo, an expanded posture, an asymmetric smile, directed gaze,
head tilted back, leaning back, and generally slower movements. None of the videos contained
audio information. The videos are available online as supplemental material.
To verify the efficiency of each display to convey the emotion, we conducted a pretest
with 107 participants from the same population. After watching the authentic pride (n = 30),
hubristic pride (n = 37), or embarrassment video (n = 40), participants indicated whether
the displayed emotion was either anger, pride, embarrassment, happiness, disappointment,
or no emotion. The authentic pride video, p(pride|authentic pride) = .67, and the hubris-
tic pride video, p(pride|hubristic pride) = .73, were equally likely to be perceived as pride,
χ2(1) = 0.32, p = .58. The embarrassment video was also perceived as embarrassment,
p(embarrassment|embarrassment) = .95. The full pattern corresponded to a significant ef-
fect, χ2(10) = 109.73, p < .001. The authentic pride display was sometimes confused with
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happiness, p(happiness|authentic pride) = .33. Nevertheless, it was marginally more often
perceived as pride, p = .07. The hubristic pride display was not confused with one particular
other emotion. Subsequently, participants indicated whether the person felt either accom-
plished, achieving, confident, fulfilled, productive, had selfworth, and felt successful (authen-
tic pride), arrogant, conceited, egotistical, pompous, smug, snobbish, and stuck-up (hubristic
pride), embarrassed, shy, abashed, rueful, ashamed, and affected (embarrassment), or neither
of these. The options for authentic and hubristic pride were as in the pretest of Study 3.2.
The embarrassment option was created according to the same scheme. The authentic pride
video was perceived as authentic pride, p(authentic pride) = .94, the hubristic pride video
as hubristic pride, p(hubristic pride) = .84, and the embarrassment video as embarrassment
p(embarrassment) = .93. Other categories were negligible, which is important as the poten-
tial confusion of authentic pride with happiness would have resulted in more neither of these
responses given that it did not convey pride. The present result instead implies that, even
though authentic pride has some obvious resemblance to happiness (being a positive emo-
tion), participants were able to identify the emotion in the way we intended. The full pattern
corresponded to a significant effect, χ2(6) = 171.34, p< .001. The videos can be found online
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000026.supp.
In the main study, after watching the videos, participants answered items measuring be-
nign (α= .72) and malicious envy (α= .87) as well as intensity of negative affect (α= .74).
For a more conservative test of our hypothesis, we decided to exclude items from the benign
and malicious envy scales that could be interpreted as having a semantic overlap with a posi-
tive attitude toward the envied person. For example, benign envy is associated with a stronger
feeling of admiration for the other person than malicious envy. To this end, we included only
items that focus on the motivational and behavioral components of benign (e.g., „I try harder
to also obtain a good grade in the next exam“ and „Tina’s/ Tim’s success encourages me“)
and malicious envy (e.g., „I wish that Tina/Tim would fail at something“ and „I would have
liked to hurt Tina/Tim“). This is in line with research on benign and malicious envy, which
has identified these distinct motivational tendencies as a crucial difference between the two
forms of envy (see Footnote 7). All items can be found in Appendix B (Table B4).
3.6.2 Results.
We hypothesized that authentic pride would foster benign envy and hubristic pride would
foster malicious envy. These hypotheses were confirmed. Descriptive and inferential statistics
can be found in Table 3.3. A MANOVA with display condition (authentic pride vs. hubristic
pride vs. embarrassment) as independent variable and benign envy, malicious envy, and inten-
sity of negative affect as dependent variable revealed a multivariate effect of display condition,
F(6, 594) = 10.23, p < .001, η2p = .09. Post hoc Tukey’s tests indicated that authentic pride
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led to more benign envy than hubristic pride (p < .001) and embarrassment (p = .001). The
latter two did not differ (p = .62). In contrast, hubristic pride led to more malicious envy
than authentic pride (p < .001) and embarrassment (p < .001). The latter two did not differ
(p = .14).
Unexpectedly, there was also a marginally significant effect of display condition on in-
tensity of negative affect, mostly driven by a marginal effect between authentic and hubristic
pride (p = .06). However, controlling for negative affect did not alter the level of significance
of any finding. As we did not find similar effects in the other studies, this finding should be
interpreted only with caution.
Table 3.3. Descriptive and Inferential Statistics for the Effect of Display Condition on Benign
Envy, Malicious Envy, and Intensity of Negative Affect in Study 3.3.
Variable MAuth (SD) MHubr (SD) MEmba (SD) F(2, 298) p η2p
Benign Envy 4.10 (1.24) 3.35 (1.12) 3.50 (1.08) 12 < .001 .08
Malicious Envy 2.19 (1.21) 3.53 (1.65) 2.58 (1.51) 22.6 < .001 .12
Intensitiy of Negative Affect 4.21 (1.43) 4.66 (1.41) 4.35 (1.38) 2.27 .07 .02
Note. Answers were given on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).
3.6.3 Discussion.
Study 3.3 shows the predicted pattern. Authentic pride distinctively increased benign envy,
whereas hubristic pride distinctively increased malicious envy. Importantly, when the com-
petitor displayed embarrassment, both envy forms were low. Together with Study 3.2, this
shows that the effect of pride on envy exists above and beyond perceiving others with high
achievement.
3.7 Study 3.4
In Study 3.4, we investigated the underlying mechanisms of the relation of envy and pride.
A prominent model that explains effects of emotions on observers is the emotions as social
information model (EASI; Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef et al., 2011). According to this model,
individuals observe another’s emotion display, which causes affective reactions toward this
person as well as inferences regarding this person’s intentions and behavioral inclinations.
These two pathways ultimately affect the individual’s response. We argue that, in competitive
situations, the affective pathway relates to the likability of the pride expressing person and the
inferential pathway relates to how status is conveyed by this emotional display.
First, we hypothesize that authentic pride expressions are more likable (Cheng et al., 2013).
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As liking breeds felt similarity (Collisson & Howell, 2014) and fosters assimilation toward
another person (Mussweiler, 2003), authentic pride should therefore spur benign envy. In
contrast, we hypothesize that hubristic pride expressions are less likable (Cheng et al., 2013).
As less likable others’ positive outcomes are rated as undeserved (Feather, 2006), an appraisal
that elicits malicious envy (Van de Ven et al., 2012), hubristic pride should spur malicious
envy.
Second, we hypothesize that status conferral corresponds to the inferential pathway in the
EASI model. As alluded to above, we argue that envy is the emotional response to another’s
higher status. Importantly, pride’s forms differ in how status is conveyed. Perceiving authentic
pride is related to inferences of prestige (Cheng et al., 2010). Prestige operates through respect
and signals that the individual is willing to share knowledge, skill, and knowhow (Cheng et al.,
2013). This turns more successful individuals into means to improve performance (Crusius &
Lange, 2014; Van de Ven et al., 2009, 2011a) thereby potentially spurring benign envy. Per-
ceiving hubristic pride is related to inferences of dominance (Cheng et al., 2010). Dominance
operates through fear and signals that the individual is willing to use force and intimidation in
order to maintain the hierarchy (Cheng et al., 2013). This should undermine personal control
over outcomes and therefore increase malicious envy (Van de Ven et al., 2012).
In sum, we hypothesized that authentic pride leads to a more likable impression and to in-
ferences of prestige. Via these routes it should modulate envy more toward its benign form. In
contrast, we expected hubristic pride to decrease perceived likability and to cause inferences
of dominance. Via these routes it should modulate envy more toward its malicious form. To
investigate these hypotheses, we asked participants to imagine being worse-off in a competi-
tive situation and presented them with opponents who expressed either authentic or hubristic
pride. Then, we measured liking, prestige, dominance, and benign as well as malicious envy.
3.7.1 Method.
Participants. Four hundred two mTurk workers participated in Study 3.4. We excluded
participants who indicated we should not use their data (n = 2) and who indicated neither
of these on the pride manipulation check item (n = 3). This was recommended by Tracy and
Prehn (2012) as these participants perceived no pride at all. The final sample size was N = 397
with a mean age of 34.96 years (SD= 10.98; one missing value). Two hundred forty-one were
male.
Materials and procedure. We used a similar paradigm as in Study 3.3. Participants again
imagined being worse-off in a personally relevant exam. As we ran the study with U.S. partic-
ipants, the superior comparison standards were now called Hillary or Joe (gender matched). In
comparison to Studies 3.2 and 3.3, we employed a more established manipulation of pride re-
lying on pictures from the University of California, Davis, Set of Emotion Expressions (Tracy,
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Robins, & Schriber, 2009). Specifically, we showed a photograph of a person displaying pride
with hands akimbo, expanded posture, head tilted backward, and a slight smile. We used the
Caucasian expressers as this was the most frequent ethnicity in our sample. As shown by
Tracy and Prehn (2012) the pride display in the photograph does not differentiate between
authentic and hubristic pride. However, the expression can be disambiguated by knowledge
about the proud person’s attribution pattern. For authentic pride, this is the case if the person
showing the expression attributes success to unstable, controllable causes (Tracy & Robins,
2007a). To achieve this in our study (n = 231), Hillary/Joe said „I did well on this exam be-
cause I studied hard.“ Perceivers will infer hubristic pride, if the person attributes success to
stable, uncontrollable causes (Tracy & Robins, 2007a). To achieve this in our study (n= 166),
Hillary/Joe said „I did well on this exam because I am talented.“ This text was inserted into
a speech bubble accompanying the picture (Tracy & Prehn, 2012). As manipulation check,
participants were asked to rate whether they think this person feels authentic pride, hubristic
pride, or neither of these, as in the pretests of Studies 3.2 and 3.3.
Then, participants answered three items referring to liking of the person (e.g., „I think
Hillary/Joe is a very nice person“; α = .84) on a scale from 1 (does not apply at all) to
7 (applies very much). This was followed by nine items measuring prestige (e.g., „Her/his
unique talents and abilities are recognized by others in the seminar“; α= .88) and eight items
measuring dominance (e.g., „S/he is willing to use aggressive tactics to get her/his way“;
α = .91) taken from Cheng and colleagues (2013, 2010). Participants responded on a scale
from 1 (not at all) to 4 (somewhat) to 7 (very much).
Finally, participants answered items measuring benign (α= .74) and malicious envy (α=
.89) as well as intensity of negative affect (α = .65). As in Study 3.3, these scales did not
include items that could be interpreted as having a semantic overlap with a positive attitude
toward the envied person and therefore likability and prestige. All items can be found in the
supplementary data (Table B6).
3.7.2 Results.
Manipulation check. We first checked whether our manipulation of pride was successful.
Participants should interpret the person’s display as authentic pride in the condition in which
s/he attributes success to effort. In contrast, participants should interpret the person’s display
as hubristic pride in the condition in which s/he attributes success to talent. We used a χ2-test
with attribution (effort vs. talent) as independent variable and pride (authentic vs. hubristic) as
dependent variable. The pride expression combined with an effort attribution was perceived as
authentic pride in 67% of the cases (and therefore as hubristic pride in 33% of the cases). The
pride expression combined with a talent attribution was perceived as hubristic pride in 70% of
the cases (and therefore as authentic pride in 30% of the cases). This pattern corresponded to a
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significant effect, χ2(1) = 52.89, p< .001, confirming that participants differentiated between
authentic and hubristic pride on the basis of the given expressions. Thus, our manipulation
was effective. Henceforth, we refer to the effort condition as authentic pride and the talent
condition as hubristic pride.
Effect of pride on envy. As stated above, we argue that authentic pride leads to more
benign and less malicious envy compared with hubristic pride. This should be mediated via
increased liking and prestige versus dominance inferences. As subsidiary hypotheses, we pre-
dicted that there is no difference for the intensity of negative affect. To test this, we first used
a MANOVA with pride condition (authentic pride vs. hubristic pride) as independent variable
and benign envy, malicious envy, liking, prestige, dominance, and intensity of negative af-
fect as dependent variables. This revealed a significant multivariate effect of pride condition,
F(6, 390) = 7.10, p < .001, η2p = .10. Descriptive and inferential statistics can be found in
Table 3.4. Our predictions were confirmed. Authentic pride compared to hubristic pride led
to more benign envy, less malicious envy, increased liking, more inferred prestige, and less
inferred dominance. Also in line with our hypotheses, there was no difference in terms of the
intensity of negative affect.
Table 3.4. Descriptive and Inferential Statistics for the Effect of Pride Condition on Benign
Envy, Malicious Envy, Liking, Prestige, Dominance, and Intensity of Negative Affect in Study
3.4.
Variable MAuthentic (SD) MHubristic (SD) F(1, 395) p η2p
Benign Envy 5.00 (1.13) 4.74 (1.07) 5.40 .02 .01
Malicious Envy 2.49 (1.49) 2.96 (1.54) 9.32 .002 .06
Liking 4.27 (1.45) 3.46 (1.36) 31.66 < .001 .07
Prestige 4.84 (0.98) 4.45 (1.01) 14.68 < .001 .04
Dominance 3.83 (1.26) 4.38 (1.23) 19.25 < .001 .05
Intensity of Negative Affect 4.86 (1.18) 4.90 (1.33) 0.05 .82 < .001
Note. Answers were given on scales from 1 to 7.
Then, we examined our predicted mediation effects with a structural equation model. In
the model, pride condition served as independent variable. Benign and malicious envy served
as dependent variables. Liking of Hillary/Joe as well as inferences of prestige and domi-
nance served as parallel mediators. We included paths only from liking and prestige to be-
nign envy (and not from dominance) and from liking and dominance to malicious envy (and
not from prestige) given our specific hypotheses. The error terms of the mediators and the
error terms of the envy forms were free to covary. We tested for mediation with 5,000 boot-
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strap resamples and bias-corrected confidence intervals (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The re-
sults of this mediation analysis can be found in Figure 3.4. The model fit was excellent,
χ2(4) = 3.66, p= .45,CFI = 1.00, RMSEA= .000, 95% CI [.000; .073]. The total indirect ef-
fects of pride condition on benign envy, ab= 0.36, 95% CI [0.21;0.51], p < .001, and of pride
condition on malicious envy were significant, ab =−0.49, 95% CI [−0.67;−0.32], p < .001,
as were all individual indirect effects (ps < .001).
Pride Condition
Benign Envy
Liking
-0.81*
0.19*
Dominance
Prestige
Malicious Envy
-0.39*
0.56*
-0.39*
0.53*
0.30*
e3
e2
e1
e4
e5
-.54*
.49*
-.35*
-.04
Figure 3.4. Mediation effect of pride (1 = authentic pride, 2 = hubristic pride) on envy via
liking, prestige, and dominance in Study 3.4. Coefficients constitute unstandardized
regression weights and correlation coefficients. ∗p < .001.
An alternative model including the direct effects from pride condition on benign envy and
malicious envy did not improve model fit ∆χ2(2) = 1.43, p= .49. Both direct effects were not
significant (ps > .23), reflecting the pattern of a full mediation. Furthermore, an alternative
model including paths from prestige to malicious envy and dominance to benign envy did also
not improve model fit, ∆χ2(2) = 2.08, p = .35. Both direct effects were not significant (ps
> .21), confirming the distinct relations of prestige and dominance inferences with benign and
malicious envy.
3.7.3 Discussion.
Study 3.4 supports our contention that authentic pride modulates envy more toward its
benign form and hubristic pride modulates envy more toward its malicious form mediated via
liking and prestige versus dominance. These processes correspond to the affective (liking)
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and inferential pathways (status inferences of prestige and dominance) of the EASI model
(Van Kleef, 2009). This constitutes strong evidence that pride shapes envious responding.
We argue that the effect of pride on envy is social such that the superior person’s pride
display affects the inferior person’s envy. To manipulate envy in Study 3.4, we presented pho-
tographs with pride expressions and added knowledge about success attributions to it. This
procedure is based on the fact that authentic and hubristic pride may share the same ambigu-
ous bodily display but can be differentiated with the help of these attribution patterns (Tracy
& Prehn, 2012). However, a potential alternative explanation of these findings could be that
this attribution information about the causes of another’s success alone may suffice to elicit
benign or malicious envy. More specifically, it might be that a person learns that one needs
effort to be successful in a particular situation. This could lead to the impression that suc-
cess is under personal control and therefore increase benign envy (Van de Ven et al., 2012).
Such an effect might happen independently of any authentic pride display, simply via available
knowledge in the environment. The same applies to the hubristic pride condition in which par-
ticipants could learn that success is contingent on ability, thus, cannot be controlled, and then
increases malicious envy (Van de Ven et al., 2012). Importantly, however, a social-functional
approach predicts that even if this contextual knowledge alone may affect envy (e.g., via ap-
praisals of personal control), a pride display of the superior person should modulate it more
strongly. When knowledge about attribution patterns is conveyed by the pride displaying, su-
perior person—as authentic or hubristic pride—this should elicit the specific complementary
envious response in the inferior person to manage the increased status of the competitor. Thus,
the effect of effort versus ability attributions on the modulation of envy should be greater when
conveyed by a pride displaying person compared to when the very same information is con-
veyed by another source.
3.8 Study 3.5
The aim of Study 3.5 was to show that our effects are social in nature, thus, that they
are based on the superior person displaying either authentic or hubristic pride and not simply
caused by impersonal contextual knowledge. Participants were confronted with Hillary/Joe as
in Study 3.4. In all cases, s/he displayed ambiguous pride. However, in one condition s/he
also conveyed information about effort and ability requirements, thereby expressing either au-
thentic or hubristic pride. In other conditions, this information was given by an omnipresent
narrator (Tracy & Prehn, 2012). We predicted that effort attributions would shift envy more to-
ward its benign form compared to ability attributions. This effect, however, should be stronger
when information about the attribution pattern are presented by the person compared with an
omnipresent narrator.
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3.8.1 Method.
Participants. Four hundred six workers from mTurk participated in Study 3.5. We again
excluded participants who indicated we should not use their data (n = 10) or indicated neither
of these on the pride manipulation check (n= 10) as recommended by Tracy and Prehn (2012).
Thus, the final sample size was N = 386. The mean age was 27.95 years (SD = 7.96) and 269
were male.
Materials and procedure. We asked participants to imagine the same situation as they
did in Studies 3.3 and 3.4. They were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2
(Attribution: effort vs. ability) X 2 (Source: person vs. narrator) between subjects design. The
person conditions were the same as in Study 3.4. Participants imagined that having gotten their
grade, they talked to Hillary/Joe (gender matched) who displayed pride and either said that
s/he was successful because s/he studied hard (effort, n = 88) or is talented (ability, n = 103).
In the narrator conditions, Hillary/Joe also displayed pride but there was no speech bubble.
Instead, in the main text we either inserted the sentence „S/he did well on this exam because
s/he studied hard“ (effort, n = 103) or „S/he did well on this exam because s/he is talented“
(ability, n = 92; Tracy & Prehn, 2012).
Afterward, participant indicated whether they perceived authentic pride, hubristic pride,
or neither of these in Hillary/Joe as they did in the previous studies. Finally, participants rated
their envy. As our predictions refer to modulations of envy between benign and malicious, we
decided to simplify our design. Instead of separate scales, participants rated their agreement
on a scale from 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (applies very much) with seven items measuring
the manifestation of envy (e.g., „Hillary/Joe inspires me to also obtain a good grade in the
next exam.“ „I wish that Hillary/Joe would fail at something“ [reverse coded]). Items were
recoded such that high values indicate benign envy and low values indicate malicious envy.
Using this scale allowed us to more strongly pit the two poles of envy against each other. The
resulting scale was reliable (α= .76). The items can be found in Appendix B.
Note that the information is exactly the same in the person and narrator conditions. In all
cases Hillary/Joe is proud of her/his success and this either depended on effort or ability. The
conditions differ only in who conveys this information, the superior person herself/himself or
an omnipresent narrator.
3.8.2 Results.
Manipulation check. We hypothesized that effort attributions would lead to perceptions
of authentic pride and that ability attributions would lead to perceptions of hubristic pride.
This should be more pronounced when they are displayed by the actor as compared with when
they are conveyed by an omnipresent narrator. Thus, there should be a stronger effect of the
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attribution on pride perceptions in the person conditions than in the narrator conditions.
In the person conditions, participants perceived the pride display with effort attributions as
authentic pride in 70% of the cases (and therefore as hubristic pride in 30% of the cases). In
contrast, participants perceived the pride display with ability attributions as hubristic pride in
69% of the cases (and therefore as authentic pride in 31% of the cases), χ2(1) = 29.45, p <
.001. In the narrator conditions, we found a similar pattern that was considerably weaker. Par-
ticipants perceived the pride display with accompanying effort attributions by the narrator as
authentic pride in 54% of the cases (and therefore as hubristic pride in 46% of the cases) and
with ability attributions they perceived it as hubristic pride in 61% of the cases (and therefore
as authentic pride in 39% of the cases), χ2(1) = 4.71, p = .03. This pattern corresponded to
a significant interaction effect of Attribution (effort vs. ability) X Source (person vs. narra-
tor) in a logistic regression with Pride (0 = authentic pride, 1 = hubristic pride) as criterion,
B = −1.04, SE = 0.43, χ2(1) = 5.83, p = .02, OR = 0.35, 95% CI [0.15;0.82]. The interac-
tion qualified main effects of attribution, B = 2.70, SE = 0.7, χ2(1) = 15.09, p < .001, OR =
14.93, 95% CI [3.82;58.41] and source, B = 1.45, SE = 0.69, χ2(1) = 4.48, p = .03, OR =
4.27, 95% CI [1.11;16.4].
Thus, our manipulation was effective. When the person displayed pride and indicated that
s/he was successful because of invested effort or talent, respective authentic and hubristic pride
perceptions were much more pronounced compared to the narrator conditions.
Effect of pride on envy. As the manipulation check showed that participants perceived
authentic and hubristic pride when the emotion was expressed by Hillary/Joe, did this also
modulate their envious responding? Our main hypothesis was that effort attributions will
modulate envy more toward the benign form compared to ability attributions when displayed
by the person compared to the narrator. This hypothesis was fully confirmed. The results are
depicted in Figure 3.5.
In the person condition, participants’ envy was more benign when Hillary/Joe attributed
success to effort (M = 5.48, SD= 1.11) compared with when s/he attributed it to ability (M =
4.86, SD = 1.06), F(1, 382) = 14.33, p < .001, η2p = .04. When contextual knowledge was
conveyed by an omnipresent narrator, the effort condition (M = 5.24, SD= 1.17) did not differ
from the ability condition (M = 5.15, SD = 1.17), F(1, 382) = 0.33, p = .57, η2p = .001. In
addition, in the effort condition, envy was descriptively more benign when the information
was conveyed by the person compared with the narrator while the effect was not significant,
F(1, 382) = 2.10, p= .15,η2p = .01. In contrast, in the ability condition, envy was marginally
more malicious when the information was conveyed by the person compared to the narrator,
F(1, 382) = 3.21, p = .07, η2p = .01.
Overall, this pattern corresponded to a significant interaction in an ANOVA with attribu-
tion (effort vs. ability) and source (person vs. narrator) as independent variables and envy
as dependent variable, F(1, 382) = 5.25, p = .02, η2p = .01. The interaction qualified a main
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effect of attribution, F(1, 382) = 9.58, p = .002, η2p = .02. The main effect of source was not
significant (F < 1).
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Person Narrator
E
n
v
y
Effort Ability
Figure 3.5. Interaction effect of attribution and source on envy in Study 3.5. High values on
envy correspond to more benign envy, low values correspond to more malicious envy. Error
bars represent one standard error of the mean.
3.8.3 Discussion.
Study 3.5 supports a social-functional view of envy and pride. Effort compared with ability
attributions about success modulated envy more toward its benign form but only when they
were conveyed by the person. If they were conveyed by an omnipresent narrator, the effect
did not occur. Only when the superior person expressed pride via a display in concert with the
corresponding attribution pattern—thus, as authentic or hubristic pride—envy was modulated.
This implies that envy is intensified as a social response to another person’s distinct status
display. If the narrator presented the attribution information, participants lacked the respective
knowledge to differentiate between authentic and hubristic pride on the side of the superior
person and their envious response was not modulated.
So far, the data show that pride fosters envy. More specifically, authentic and hubristic
pride affect benignly and maliciously envious intentions. These pathways are mediated via
liking and inferred prestige as well as dominance. Nevertheless, we aimed at going beyond
Studies 3.1 to 3.5 by assessing actual envious behavior. This is rarely done in envy research
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(Smith & Kim, 2007) and would provide stronger evidence for the motivational effects re-
vealed before. Do enviers actually intensify their effort in the face of an authentic pride ex-
pressing competitor? Do hubristic pride expressions really spur harmful behavior? We tested
such effects of pride displays on envious behavior in Study 3.6.
3.9 Study 3.6
In Study 3.6, participants took part in an ostensible competition with items from the remote
associates task (RAT) for a monetary reward and lost against their opponent. We afterward
measured maliciously and benignly envious behavior by giving them the chance to select more
difficult RAT items for their competitor and by giving them the chance to increase their effort
in a second round of RAT items themselves.
3.9.1 Method.
Participants. One hundred ninety-eight workers from mTurk participated in Study 3.6.
We again excluded everyone who indicated we should not use their data (n = 2). In addition,
as participants competed in the RAT, a language-based achievement task, we a priori decided
to exclude non-native speakers as we did in Study 3.2. Finally, as indicated by our log data,
one participant used the back button during the second round of RAT items and therefore had
more time to solve the task rendering the data meaningless. Thus, the final sample size was
N = 187 with a mean age of 34.32 years (SD = 11.38). Ninety-nine were male.
Materials and procedure. Participants were invited to a study on the effect of competitive
situations on personal action. We told them that they would compete against another mTurk
worker and therefore had to choose a nickname. Then, we presented an ostensible selection
process in which several nicknames of supposed other participants were displayed and denied
because of mismatches in age and gender until Alex14 was selected as competitor. We decided
in favor of a gender-neutral name to increase felt similarity of participants and competitor
without changing the nickname.
Afterward, we introduced the task in which they would compete. The task was based on
items of the RAT (McFarlin & Blascovich, 1984). In the RAT participants have to find a
semantically related word to three other words. In our study, participants had seven minutes
to solve as many of eight items as possible. We told them that, based on the number of
correct responses and the pretested difficulty of each item, we would calculate a final score.
The competitor with the highest score would receive 50 cents as a bonus payment. Although
rather small, such an incentive is higher than the typical average pay for a short task on mTurk.
Therefore, we expected them to be highly motivated to win against their opponent.
In fact, the competition was manipulated. We included several very difficult items to
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ensure that participants would not solve all the items. After a screen asking them to wait
for Alex14, we gave them the feedback that of 147 points possible, they achieved 26 points.
Alex14, however, achieved 124 points. Such a difference in performance should elicit envy
and would be a realistic result to be proud of for Alex14 (Williams & DeSteno, 2008).
Afterward, participants were allowed to exchange a chat message with Alex14. We pre-
tended to connect them to a chat server and Alex14 was the first to type in a message. Here
we introduced our manipulation of pride. In contrast to the solely visual manipulations in
Studies 3.2 and 3.3 and the combination of visual and verbal information in Studies 3.4 and
3.5, we chose a manipulation of authentic and hubristic pride with only verbal information.
In the authentic pride condition (n = 95), Alex14 wrote „My reswult is awesome! I am very
proud of myself that I won the competition and I am happy about the money I get!! Honestly,
I really put lots of effort into the task...“ We purposely included a spelling mistake to make the
message more realistic. In addition, by mentioning how great the success felt and how proud
Alex14 was, we aimed at fostering envy on the side of the participant and communicate pride
in the absence of a visual display. In the hubristic pride condition (n = 92), we changed only
the last sentence to „Honestly, I am a natural talent...“ (adapted from Tracy & Prehn, 2012).
Thus, Alex14 displayed pride in both cases but either attributed success to effort or to ability,
thereby expressing either authentic or hubristic pride.
Then, participants first rated Alex14 and subsequently themselves on the same set of emo-
tion terms. In this set we included several emotions related to victory and defeat to mask
the aims of the study. Among them were our critical items measuring perceptions of feelings
of authentic (accomplished, productive, achieving; α = .78) and hubristic pride (arrogant,
pompous, snobbish; α = .91) adapted from Tracy and Robins (2007a). We also asked how
envious they thought Alex14 is and how envious they felt. The filler items were ashamed,
happy, proud, and sad.
Afterward, we told participants that they would work on a second round of items from the
RAT, however this time without any competition. If they achieved 100 points, they would earn
an additional bonus of 50 cents. We informed them that Alex14 would get the same chance
and that they would have the opportunity to affect the set of items Alex14 would have to work
on. Alex14, however, would not have the opportunity to affect the participant’s set.
Then, we measured our central dependent variables. First, participants were presented
with a choice among different RAT items. We did not present the actual items but provided
them with a choice among eight easy, eight average, and eight very difficult items. Participants
selected eight items in total that would then be presented to Alex14.
Second, participants again worked on eight RAT items for which they had 7 min. Given
that we deliberately included several very difficult items among the set of only eight RAT
items, we expected to find an effect of pride on persistence but not on performance. This
notion is supported by the finding that performance and persistence on the RAT were only
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moderately correlated, r(187) = .28, p < .001. Even if participants put more effort into solv-
ing the task, the extreme difficulty of some of the items impeded that this increased effort
could be translated into substantial performance gains.
At the end of the study, participants were debriefed that there was no actual competitor
and everyone was compensated with an additional dollar, the maximum amount of money
they potentially could have earned during the ostensible competition of the study.
3.9.2 Results.
Manipulation check. We tested whether participants perceived authentic and hubristic
pride in Alex14 in the respective condition and whether participants were equally envious
across the two conditions. First, we hypothesized that, in the authentic pride condition, in
which Alex14 attributed success to effort, authentic pride ratings should be higher compared
with the hubristic pride condition in which Alex14 attributed success to ability. The reversed
should be true for the hubristic pride scale. This prediction was confirmed. Descriptive and
inferential statistics can be found in Table 3.5. Participants endorsed more authentic pride
in the authentic pride condition than in the hubristic pride condition. Participants endorsed
less hubristic pride in the authentic pride condition than in the hubristic pride condition. This
corresponded to a significant interaction effect in a mixed ANOVA with pride (authentic pride
vs. hubristic pride) and scale (authentic pride vs. hubristic pride) as independent variables
with repeated-measures on the last factor, F(1, 185) = 39.83, p < .001, η2p = .18. The in-
teraction qualified main effects of pride, F(1, 185) = 15.71, p < .001, η2p = .08, and scale,
F(1, 185) = 16.73, p < .001, η2p = .08. Thus, our manipulation was effective in manipulating
pride. Based on the attributions mentioned in the chat message, Alex14 was either perceived
as being authentically proud or hubristically proud.
Second, we hypothesized that participants would report envy and that they would feel so
equally strongly in both conditions. Although authentic and hubristic pride modulate envious
responding more toward benign or malicious envy, they should spur general envy to the same
degree. Indeed, in the authentic pride condition and the hubristic pride condition, participants
were equally envious.
Table 3.5. Descriptive and Inferential Statistics for the Manipulation Checks of Study 3.6.
Variable MAuthentic (SD) MHubristic (SD) F(1, 185) p η2p
Authentic Pride 3.88 (0.91) 3.57 (0.94) 5.36 .02 .03
Hubristic Pride 2.68 (1.24) 3.82 (1.12) 43.59 < .001 .19
General Envy 2.37 (1.24) 2.09 (1.29) 2.29 .13 .01
Note. Answers were given on a scale from 1 (does not apply at all) to 5 (applies very much). One missing value for general envy.
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Effect of pride on envy-driven behavior. Did the perception of authentic and hubristic
pride affect behavioral outcomes of benign and malicious envy?
Set difficulty. We first tested whether pride had an effect on the difficulty of the set. To cal-
culate a difficulty score, we assigned a value of 1 for each easy item chosen by the participant,
a value of 2 for each average item, and a 3 for each very difficult item, and then summed up
all values. Thus, this score can vary from 8 (only easy items) to 24 (only very difficult items).
Thus, higher values imply more assigned set difficulty. As alluded to above, when participants
perceived hubristic pride in Alex14 they should feel malicious envy and therefore select more
difficult RAT items. The social goal of malicious envy is to harm the position of the envied
person. Thus, participants should be motivated to hinder Alex14 to remain a high-achiever and
therefore give her/him more difficult items. This hypothesis was confirmed (see Figure 3.6 left
panel). Set difficulty was lower in the authentic pride condition (M = 17.79, SD = 5.70) than
in the hubristic pride condition (M = 19.46, SD = 5.49). This corresponded to a main effect
in an ANOVA with Pride (authentic pride vs. hubristic pride) as independent variable and set
difficulty as dependent variable, F(1, 185) = 4.14, p = .04, η2p = .02.
RAT. Next, we investigated the hypothesis that perceiving authentic pride would spur
benign envy and therefore increase effortful behavior directed at increasing one’s own sta-
tus. Such behavior would fulfill the social goal of the envier. In this case, participants
should persist longer in the second round of RAT items. In particular, all RAT items were
presented to participants on the same page. Participants were free to proceed to the next
page whenever they wanted to. We measured persistence as the total time spent on this
page. Our hypothesis was confirmed (see Figure 3.6 right panel). As we set a maximum
value of time spent on the RAT items of 7 min, we examined the effect of pride on persis-
tence in a Kaplan-Meyer Survival Analysis. In such a case, an ANOVA is not appropriate
(Van de Ven et al., 2011a). As predicted, participants persisted longer in the authentic pride
condition (M = 205s, SE = 13, Mdn = 173s, SE = 13) than in the hubristic pride condition
(M = 168s, SE = 12, Mdn = 129s, SE = 7), Breslow χ2(1) = 4.78, p = .03.
Although not predicted, we nevertheless checked whether pride had an effect on perfor-
mance in the RAT. Descriptively, participants solved on average more RAT items in the au-
thentic pride condition (M = 4.27, SD = 1.65) than in the hubristic pride condition (M =
4.08, SD = 2.05), yet, this difference was not significant in an ANOVA with pride (authen-
tic pride vs. hubristic pride) as independent variable and performance as dependent variable,
F(1, 185) = 0.53, p= .47, η2p = .003. Again, this null effect was to be expected given that we
deliberately administered a number of very difficult items in a set of only eight RAT items to
be able to measure persistence.
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Figure 3.6. Effects of authentic and hubristic pride on set difficulty (left panel) and
persistence on the RAT (right panel) in Study 3.6. Error bars represent one standard error of
the mean.
3.9.3 Discussion.
Study 3.6 presents behavioral evidence for the relation of authentic and hubristic pride
with benign and malicious envy. Authentic pride of the envied person caused participants
to select easier RAT items for this person and to persist longer in a second round of RAT
items compared with hubristic pride. This extends the findings from Studies 3.1 to 3.5 to
behavioral outcomes. Together, these results show that enviers set the goal to improve their
performance or to harm an envied person following her or his authentic or hubristic pride ex-
pression and that they ultimately act on these intentions. This is strong evidence in favor of a
social-functional relation of envy and pride.
3.10 General Discussion
Six studies provide converging evidence for a social-functional relation of envy and pride
in competitive situations. Pride’s social goal is status enhancement. In their competitors, the
pride of successful people is met with envy, its complementary emotion. The social goal of
envy is to level the difference between the self and the upward standard. The six studies reveal
that pride displays often co-occur with envy (Study 3.1) and substantially increase its intensity
(Study 3.2). In particular, pride expressions modulate the specific pathway of envious respond-
ing (Study 3.2 to 3.6) above and beyond high achievement (Studies 3.2 and 3.3). Authentic
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pride causes a likable impression and leads to perceptions of prestige. Through this pathway,
it modulates envy toward its benign form. Hubristic pride causes a less likable impression
and leads to perceptions of dominance. Through this pathway, it modulates envy toward its
malicious form (Study 3.4). In accordance with a social approach to emotions, this effect is
based on the person who displays pride and not simply on knowledge about the reasons for
success available in the situation (Study 3.5). Finally, people not only feel more benign or
malicious envy upon perceiving authentic or hubristic pride in their competitors, they also act
on their goal with behavior that is either directed at moving upward, or aimed at damaging
the status of the other (Study 3.6). These findings converged in a methodologically diverse
set of studies. They were conducted with German (Studies 3.2 and 3.3) and U.S. participants
(Studies 3.1 and 3.4 to 3.6), in the lab (Studies 3.2 and 3.3) and online (Studies 3.1 and 3.4
to 3.6). Envy was recalled (Study 3.1), elicited in situ (Studies 3.2 and 3.6) or captured by
vignettes (Studies 3.3 to 3.5) and pride was either measured (Study 3.1) or manipulated in a
face-to-face interaction (Study 3.2), via videos (Study 3.3), in pictures (Studies 3.4 and 3.5),
or verbally (Study 3.6).
These results extend research on envy and pride in several important ways. First, they
highlight the value of investigating how these two emotions interact in social relationships,
instead of investigating them in isolation. In particular, the present studies reveal that the
active behavior of the superior person is important to understand how envy is elicited and
modulated. Previous research on envy has typically focused on intrapersonal variables. Felt
similarity, domain relevance, appraised deservingness and felt personal control (Smith & Kim,
2007; Van de Ven et al., 2012) can shape envy even in the absence of pride. Nevertheless, the
current findings underline the importance of taking the interpersonal and interactive nature
of envy and pride into account. In particular, as such an approach opens up numerous new
avenues for future research.
For instance, a social-functional approach might also be applied to envy and pride on the
group level. Many emotions such as anger, guilt, shame, or regret are also felt toward other
social groups (MacKie, Silver, & Smith, 2004). We believe that envy might also be a response
toward superior status groups and that perceptions of pride may shape envy toward them.
Pride’s social goal to convey status fosters perceptions of competence (e.g., Martens & Tracy,
2012). Furthermore, authentic and hubristic pride vary in likability (Study 3.4). Thus, inherent
in pride displays is information about both competence and warmth, the two basic dimensions
which play an important role in emotional reactions toward social groups, as depicted by the
stereotype content model (Fiske, 2010). Previous research has focused exclusively on the
malicious form of envy, showing that competent and cold groups elicit envy and that joint
effects of high status and competitiveness determine envious reactions (Caprariello, Cuddy, &
Fiske, 2009; Eckes, 2002). Given our reasoning, authentic pride should convey both warmth
and competence, which should foster benign envy. However, according to the stereotype
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content model, warm and competent groups should elicit admiration and not envy (Caprariello
et al., 2009; Fiske, 2010). Admiration is a noncompetitive emotion (Van de Ven et al., 2011a)
that elicits even more positive thoughts about the other person (or group) than benign envy
(Crusius & Lange, 2014; Van de Ven et al., 2009). Furthermore, although authentic pride
was rated as more likable than hubristic pride (Study 3.4), its likability was only slightly
above the midpoint of the scale. Therefore, it could be that authentic pride elicits medium
warmth and high competence (for the existence of such clusters see for instance Eckes, 2002).
Thus, benign envy could be a response located between admiration and malicious envy in the
stereotype content model.
An important implication of the social-functional relation of envy and pride on the group
level concerns competitions and conflicts between countries. Countries differ, for instance, in
their status when it comes to wealth, economic opportunities, or technological achievements.
In addition, many countries explicitly encourage their members to feel national pride and such
feelings are often publicly expressed via the media or in direct encounters of political leaders.
Might such pride displays in uneven status differences cause envy and thereby explain the
escalation of conflicts? We believe that this may be true given that hubristic and authentic pride
seem to map onto the distinction between patriotism and nationalism. Patriotism is fostered by
temporal comparisons about one’s own group (Mummendey, Klink, & Brown, 2001) implying
outcome variability and attributions to effort. In contrast, nationalism is a positive evaluation
of one’s own country derived from downward comparisons to other countries (Mummendey
et al., 2001) and it is associated with the view that these should be dominated (Kosterman &
Feshbach, 1989). There may be some truth in Pope Francis’ assessment that „All wars begin
in the human heart—a heart that is jealous and bitter [...]“ (Glatz, 2014). Nevertheless, the
current framework suggests that national pride and envy may also motivate benign collective
action, such as when one country serves as a role model for effort directed upward.
A social approach to envy is also important as it may serve as a basis for research on
interpersonal emotion regulation. So far, little is known about how people regulate envy. Given
that envy is elicited in a social contexts and fueled by pride-displaying individuals, a primary
way to alter envious responses should be to engage in interpersonal emotion regulation (Niven,
Totterdell, & Holman, 2009; Zaki & Williams, 2013). The superior person could adapt to the
envious competitor by inhibiting or changing any emotional display upon success. This would
constitute an effect of an envy expression (or the fear of envy) on pride.
The need for such regulatory action should be especially high when people feel distress
about being the target of a threatening upward comparison (Exline & Lobel, 1999). Specif-
ically, pride expressions should be particularly likely inhibited when the person cares about
others, feels that others could be hurt by the expression, or when competing individuals are
from the ingroup (Van Osch, 2012). In light of the current findings, this inhibition may be
adaptive in such situations. Pride should increase status in the eye of others. Nevertheless, the
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expression of pride may elicit envy in observers and may thereby undermine higher status in
the longrun. Similarly, other research has revealed that the maliciously envied person is more
prosocial toward the envier (Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2010), presumably to soothe
the situation. However, this is not to say that being envied is uniformly negative. Quite the
contrary, people sometimes also enjoy that others desire their advantages (Rodriguez Mos-
quera, Parrott, & Hurtado de Mendoza, 2010), as this might strengthen their belief in their
qualities. All these behaviors eventually assure status, either by protecting the self from be-
ing pulled down or by basking in the coveting of others. Future research could investigate
such social effects and its boundary conditions in the regulation of envy by the expression or
inhibition of pride.
A strength of the present results is that we elicited envy in situ and also measured actual
behavioral consequences of envy (for a similar methodological approach see also Crusius &
Mussweiler, 2012; Van de Ven et al., 2011a). Unfortunately, it is difficult to elicit envy in the
lab as one needs confederates and comparison domains which are of high personal relevance
to all participants. In addition, envy is not easily admitted to others (Smith & Kim, 2007) and
might therefore be difficult to detect even if present. One way to counter this can be to deplete
participants by taxing their cognitive capacities necessary to control their feelings (Crusius
& Mussweiler, 2012). As an alternative, we suggest to include pride displays as a constant
when eliciting envy in the lab. Such a display is believable, ecologically valid (see Study 3.1),
and strengthens envy (Studies 3.2 to 3.6) which might produce enough variance for the effect
under investigation.
The present findings also contribute in various ways to recent research on pride. For exam-
ple, pride displaying individuals’ behavior is copied more often than behavior of individuals
who express happiness, shame, or are emotionally neutral (Martens & Tracy, 2012). Our
framework suggests that this effect is mediated via benign envy. This fits the finding that the
behavior was copied only when participants could earn a financial reward for success (Martens
& Tracy, 2012). Thus, they were probably benignly envious of the money potentially earned
by the pride displaying individual. In this line of research, however, pride displays were not
presented together with contextual knowledge regarding attributions for success. If the per-
son would have expressed hubristic pride, we would predict that malicious envy could lead
to even less copying as enviers would try to distance themselves from the disliked, dominant
individual.
In addition, our results also contribute to the emerging conclusion that bodily displays
can convey pride in diverse ways. Specifically, sometimes pride displays are ambiguous with
respect to their potential to convey authentic or hubristic pride (Tracy & Robins, 2007b), yet
other displays allow to distinguish them (Nelson & Russell, 2014). We showed that authentic
and hubristic pride can be manipulated in videos of the face and the upper body (Study 3.3).
Furthermore we confirm, that the same can be achieved with an ambiguous pride display
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accompanied by attribution information (Studies 3.4 and 3.5). Especially the videos in Study
3.3 are valuable as they circumvent the objection that any manipulation of the pride forms
is based on the combination of visual and verbal information (see discussion of Study 3.4).
As we used a combination of bodily cues potentially associated with authentic and hubristic
pride, future research should systematically investigate which of them are sufficient to foster
the perception of the respective emotion.
The EASI model proposes that the effects of one person’s emotion display on observer’s
behavior mediated via affective and inferential pathways are moderated by social-contextual
factors and observers’ information processing (Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef et al., 2011; see
Keltner & Haidt, 1999 for a similar conceptualization). The research presented here is silent
with regard to these moderators. However, we would predict that they play an important
role that could be investigated in future research. In particular cases, these moderators could
even reverse the distinct links between authentic and hubristic pride with benign and mali-
cious envy. In the present research, affective and inferential pathways had additive effects
in explaining the relation of envy and pride (see Study 3.4). Therefore, even if one pathway
contradicts the effect of the other pathway, the specific pride form may still spur the respective
envy form. However, the moderators predicted by the EASI model might change the weighting
of the paths in predicting the response. Then, the situation can change entirely.
Two examples might help to illustrate this point. First, if the inferior person dislikes the
superior person, authentic pride might foster malicious envy as long as the inferior person’s
behavior is mostly determined by the affective pathway. The latter may be possible, for in-
stance, if the emotion display of the superior person is seen as inappropriate such as when the
inferior person has a high need for social harmony (Van Kleef et al., 2011). Second, if the
inferior person perceives the superior person’s hubristic pride display as intentional or even
humorous, this could decrease dominance perceptions or even increase prestige perceptions.
This should spur benign envy as long as the inferior person’s behavior is mostly determined
by the inferential pathway. The latter may be possible, for instance, when the individual has a
higher need for cognition or when the individual is held accountable (Van Kleef et al., 2011).
An interesting application of the aforementioned dynamics occurs in the case of rivalry.
Rivalry has been shown to increase motivation and performance (e.g., Kilduff, 2014). We think
that such effects may be partly driven by benign envy. By definition, rivals compete for the
same personally relevant resource, for instance a gold medal among athletes. Rivals’ history
and repetitive competitions should also increase felt similarity. These are central contributors
to envy (Smith & Kim, 2007). As long as rivals like and respect each other, the success of
one rival might spur benign envy and therefore increase performance (Study 3.4). However,
if the superior rival displays hubristic pride, the above results would predict that performance
decreases. This occurs frequently, for instance, when competitors proudly express that they
think they are the best in their profession. Furthermore, in light of the arguments presented
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above, authentic pride could also decrease performance in rivals once the superior rival shows
pride in an inappropriate situation. For instance, when s/he wins but the inferior rival got hurt
during the competition, authentic pride displays should foster disliking. An increased need
for social harmony in the inferior rival would shift the focus on the affective pathway and
therefore spur malicious envy.
3.11 Conclusion
The studies presented here highlight the value of investigating how the complementary
emotions pertaining to victory and defeat—pride and envy—interact. They show how the
tango of two deadly sins might be capable of explaining the enormous motivational forces
sparked in competitive interactions. Furthermore, the findings confirm the value of studying
the social emotions of pride and envy as a social-functional unit. Such an endeavor might,
ultimately, help to understand and to control competitive relationships and their multifaceted
outcomes such as in the long-term rivalry of Niki Lauda and James Hunt.
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4. General Discussion
4.1 Implications, Future Research Directions, and Limitations
In the current dissertation I propose a conceptualization of benign and malicious envy as
social-functional emotion syndromes in which perceived personal control to reach the status-
yielding standard of the envied person and appraised deservingness of the other’s advantage
jointly coordinate the affective, cognitive, and motivational components of the envy forms.
In line with this conceptualization, I hypothesized that dispositional and situational factors
that influence these appraisal dimensions would constitute determinants of benign and ma-
licious envy. The evidence presented in Chapters 2 and 3 provides initial support for these
predictions. Specifically, Chapter 2 reveals the crucial role of distinct forms of achievement
motivation—hope for success and fear of failure—in shaping envy based on the reasoning that
they increase or decrease perceived personal control, respectively. Hope for success relates to
dispositional benign envy, preparing the envier to deal with the envied person’s status-yielding
standard by pursuing an approach goal. In contrast, fear of failure relates to dispositional ma-
licious envy, preparing the envier to deal with the envied person’s status-yielding standard by
pursuing an avoidance goal. In line with the model of the elicitation of envy, achievement mo-
tivation, via the link to personal control, differentiates the motivational components of benign
and malicious envy. Furthermore, Chapter 3 demonstrates how distinct pride displays of the
envied person—authentic and hubristic pride—modulate envy based on the reasoning that the
conveyed liking and status information increase or decrease appraised deservingness and per-
ceived personal control, respectively. Authentic pride is likable and conveys status as prestige,
fostering benignly envious motivational inclinations and behavior. Hubristic pride is less lik-
able and conveys status as dominance, fostering maliciously envious motivational inclinations
and behavior. In line with the model of the elicitation of envy, pride displays, via the links
to personal control and deservingness, differentiate the affective and motivational components
of benign and malicious envy. The cognitive component was not measured. Thus, the over-
arching evidence supports the value of conceptualizing benign and malicious envy as distinct
social-functional emotion syndromes. In the following, I will elaborate on this conclusion,
offer avenues for future research, and point out limitations.
The findings and their underlying conceptualization offer important insights into the nature
of envy and allow to make new predictions about envy and its elicitation. First, they contribute
to the ongoing debate on what envy actually is. Some scholars argue that envy and its diverse
outcomes are best conceptualized as a unitary emotion in which frustration is the driving force
of emotional responding (Cohen-Charash & Larson, in press; Tai, Narayanan, & McAllister,
2012). I agree with the general proposition that envy stems from a frustrating upward compar-
ison. In my model of the elicitation of envy, this is reflected in the general effect of comparison
concern on envy (see Figure 1.1). Moreover, the unitary emotion view predicts that frustration
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triggers both, self-improvement and harming intentions, contradicting the current approach.
Researchers advocating this view mainly contend that the benign-malicious conceptualization
shares one important limitation with traditional envy research: the
coupling of envy’s substance with its consequences. That is, mali-
cious envy is linked primarily to negative outcomes, and benign envy
is associated exclusively with positive outcomes. Furthermore, this
approach fails to explain, for any given situation, why one form of
envy and its set of action tendencies is more likely to determine be-
havior than another. Finally, it says little about either the psycholog-
ical processes linking envy with behavioral outcomes or the factors
moderating these relationships. (Tai et al., 2012, p. 109)
In order to predict the diverse constructive and destructive consequences of envy, Tai and
colleagues incorporate a multitude of different moderators into their model of the elicitation of
envy. Furthermore, Cohen-Charash and Larson (in press) state that the confounding of envy
with its outcomes is also reflected in widely used measures of benign and malicious envy,
turning behavioral effects related to both envy forms into tautological inferences. Finally, they
reason that this tautology applies a value judgment to envy as being either good or bad.
The current conceptualization of benign and malicious envy as social-functional emotion
syndromes addresses these limitations and, complementarily, the evidence supports a categor-
ical view on the two envy forms. Most importantly, the emotion syndrome approach defines
both envy forms not solely by their outcomes but by affective, cognitive, and motivational
components coordinated by appraisals of personal control and deservingness and makes clear
predictions when exactly the frustration following an upward comparison modulates envy ei-
ther toward its benign or malicious manifestation. To reiterate, when the envier perceives high
personal control to reach the status-yielding standard of the envied person and appraises the
advantage as deserved, benign envy is elicited (Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2011a).
The consequences entail admiration for the envied person, attentional focus on means to reach
the upward goal, and motivated striving for self-improvement (Chapters 2 and 3; Crusius &
Lange, 2014; Van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2009, 2011b). In contrast, when the envier
perceives low personal control to reach the status-yielding standard of the envied person and
appraises the advantage as undeserved, malicious envy is elicited (Van de Ven et al., 2011a).
The consequences entail resentment for the envied person, attentional focus on the other, and
motivated striving to harm (Chapters 3; Crusius & Lange, 2014; Duffy, Scott, Shaw, Tepper, &
Aquino, 2012; Van de Ven et al., 2009). In this conceptualization, motivational outcomes are
only one component of envy and not a confound of the emotional experience and its outcomes,
dovetailing with approaches that define action-readiness (Frijda, 2007) or motivational goals
(Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994) as only one core element of emotions.
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Moreover, the current conceptualization has further advantages and addresses the other
limitations mentioned by the unitary emotion view. First, it becomes much more parsimonious
to predict that variables affecting appraisals of personal control and deservingness modulate
envy toward its benign or malicious form than incorporating a multitude of different modera-
tors directly into the model. For instance, hope for success and fear of failure probably mod-
ulate envy as they relate to appraisals of personal control and authentic and hubristic pride
probably modulate envy as they relate to appraisals of personal control and deservingness.
Yet, despite the fact that achievement motivation and pride modulate envy, it is unnecessary
to incorporate them into a model of the elicitation of envy as this would be vastly restrictive.
Second, envy was measured via its affective and motivational components as well as actual
behavior. The appraisal dimensions should be responsible in coordinating the various com-
ponents of benign and malicious envy. Thus, as certain dispositional and situational variables
relate to the components of envy via appraisal dimensions and not directly, the model circum-
vents the objections that these findings are tautological or evaluative. Quite the contrary, they
reveal how envy provides the individual with the social-functional basis to adaptively deal
with frustrating upward comparison and how certain dispositional and situational variables
determine which pathway of envious responding is adaptive in a given situation. For instance,
it is neither tautological to show that different pride displays affect the envier’s persistence on
an achievement task or the set difficulty assigned to the competitor (Chapter 3) nor is it inher-
ently good or bad to set higher goals for a marathon or avoid a specific time goal (Chapter 2).
I argue that these effects are best understood as social-functional responses given situational
(pride’s conveyed liking and status) or dispositional (achievement motivation) determinants
relating to different appraisal dimensions of benign and malicious envy.
In addition, other recent evidence also speaks to the distinctiveness of benign and mali-
cious envy. Falcon (2015) applied taxometric analysis (a method that statistically differenti-
ates whether the latent structure of a construct is best conceptualized as categorical or dimen-
sional) to demonstrate that envy situations that were sampled over the course of two weeks
fit a categorical structure, mapping onto the distinction of benign and malicious envy. Var-
ious items related to the affective and motivational components of both forms distinguished
between them. This also dovetails with evidence that in many languages such as German or
Dutch there are two words to refer to envy which are linked to either the benign or malicious
manifestation (Crusius & Lange, 2014; Van de Ven et al., 2009). In sum, there is growing
support for a conceptualization of envy as having two forms.
Are there any opportunities to falsify my model of the elicitation of envy? I think there
are. The current conceptualization is based on the reasoning that appraisals of personal control
and deservingness coordinate the diverse affective, cognitive, and motivational components of
benign and malicious envy. One can falsify this model in at least three ways. First, proponents
of the unitary view argue that the previous conceptualization of envy proper (based mainly
Jens Lange The elicitation of envy 72
on malicious envy) sufficed to predict envy-driven consequences categorized as malicious and
benign (for the argument see Cohen-Charash & Larson, in press; for ostensible evidence see
for instance Cohen-Charash, 2009; Schaubroeck & Lam, 2004). The conceptualization of
envy proper described envy as an emotion triggered by feelings of reduced personal control
(Vecchio, 2000) and appraisals of undeservingness (Smith, Parrott, Ozer, & Moniz, 1994).
Therefore, lack of control and undeservingness should also be predictors of envy’s benign
consequences. This would falsify the current conceptualization (for first attempts into this di-
rection see Cohen-Charash, 2015). However, as correlational (Lange, Crusius, & Hagemeyer,
2015) and experimental evidence (Van de Ven et al., 2011a) demonstrates that high personal
control and deservingness relate to benign envy and lack of personal control and undeserving-
ness relate to malicious envy, I would predict that these efforts may not be fruitful.
Second, unequivocal empirical evidence for the specific effects of appraisals of personal
control and deservingness on distinct components of benign and malicious envy is still lack-
ing. In the model, I propose that, for benign envy, deservingness should relate to the affective
component (admiration), whereas personal control should relate to the cognitive (means focus)
and motivational (improvement motivation) components. For malicious envy, deservingness
should relate to the affective (resentment) and cognitive (person focus) components, whereas
personal control should relate to the motivational component (harming intentions). As out-
lined in Chapter 1, some corollaries of this predicted mapping were supported in recent re-
search (stronger effects of personal control and deservingness on benign and malicious envy,
respectively, and a negative correlation of state benign and malicious envy). Furthermore,
Chapter 2 shows that a dispositional variable—achievement motivation—that is theoretically
related to personal control correlates with the motivational components of the envy forms.
Moreover, Chapter 3 demonstrates that a situational variable—pride display—that theoreti-
cally affects observers’ personal control and deservingness is associated with the affective and
motivational components of the envy forms. Yet, competing hypotheses are not pitted directly
against each other. A strong test of these predictions would be to manipulate envy, measure
appraisals of personal control and deservingness as well as the affective, cognitive, and moti-
vational components of benign and malicious envy, and test their relationships. Alternatively,
it is possible to measure or manipulate dispositional and situational variables that distinctively
affect either personal control or deservingness appraisals and then link them to the respective
components. For instance, scales measuring the belief in a just world (Dalbert, Montada, &
Schmitt, 1987) should relate to deservingness appraisals and therefore especially to the affec-
tive component of benign envy and the affective and cognitive components of malicious envy.
Varying the mutability of the person’s hierarchy should change perceptions of personal control
(Hays & Bendersky, 2015) and therefore especially influence the cognitive and motivational
components of benign envy and the motivational component of malicious envy. Disconfirming
evidence would falsify the model. However, if one could refine the predictions, the general
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approach to conceptualize benign and malicious envy as emotion syndromes may still be valid.
Third, there is limited evidence with respect to the coordination of the affective, cogni-
tive, and motivational components of benign and malicious envy. The emotion syndrome
view predicts that the components are correlated with each other (as is for instance the case in
surprise; Reisenzein, 2000). For the envy forms, I find high internal reliability for measures
covering the respective affective and motivational components (Chapters 2 and 3). Further-
more, feelings of admiration foster emulation (Schindler, Paech, & Löwenbrück, 2015) and
feelings of resentment are linked to hostile reactions (Leach, 2008). So, there is supportive ev-
idence for a correlation of the affective and motivational components of benign and malicious
envy. Moreover, recent research supports that there is a higher correlation of the components
within benign and malicious envy than between the envy forms (Falcon, 2015). However, I did
not measure the cognitive components. Therefore, I cannot present evidence directly linking
the affective and motivational components to attentional shifts. Do feelings of admiration and
self-improvement tendencies relate to an attentional focus on means to reach the upward goal?
Do feelings of resentment and harming intentions relate to an attentional focus on the other
person? Regarding the former question, admiration-driven emulation and self-improvement
tendencies represent specific goals. As goals are cognitively attached to their corresponding
means (for a review see Kruglanski et al., 2012) these might get activated alongside benign
envy’s affective and motivational component. Regarding the latter question, Smith (2000)
and Van de Ven and colleagues (2009) argued that resentment relates to a shift of personal
responsibility to the other person which I interpret as an attentional process. This suggests a
correlation of the affective and cognitive components of malicious envy. Furthermore, if the
harming intentions are socially functional, they should be focused exclusively on the envied
person and not broaden to all present individuals, implying a correlation of the motivational
and cognitive components of malicious envy. Nevertheless, the correlation of all three com-
ponents is a crucial test of the emotion syndrome approach. In principle, future research
should measure all components simultaneously and assess their relationships. Disconfirming
evidence would speak against the current conceptualization. Specifically, the most important
advantage of my model of the elicitation of envy lies in its parsimony. If the components are
uncorrelated, it will be necessary to include separate moderators for each of them (as is done
by Tai et al., 2012), eventually decreasing parsimony.
The prediction of correlated components in emotion syndromes becomes even more com-
plex as these approaches usually include two more components that I neglected so far: physi-
ological and expressive changes (Roseman, 2013). Note that the existence of all components
is not a necessary condition for a mental state to be an emotion as several emotions lack one
or more components (such as the facial expression; see for instance Ekman, 1993). Still, the
neglect of these components in my model suggests their absence. In fact, there is no research
with respect to envy dedicated to these components. Nevertheless, it is possible to derive
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certain hypotheses. In what follows, I will discuss my predictions.
Whether physiological changes are systematically associated with specific emotions is still
hotly debated. Some scholars argue that emotions are essentialized categories (Lindquist,
Gendron, Oosterwijk, & Barrett, 2013) that are constructed in situ (Barrett, 2014) and shaped
by the interpersonal context (Boiger & Mesquita, 2012). Different components of affective
states are then elicited and aligned by the process of labeling diverse sensations with distinct
emotion words (Lindquist, Satpute, & Gendron, 2015). To put it differently, constructionist
views propose, for instance, that a negative, arousing state evolves into the emotion of fear
via the process of labeling it which then fosters corresponding coordinated fear behavior and
physiological changes (see for instance Lindquist & Barrett, 2008). If the same state is la-
beled anger, then different reactions will occur. Following this approach, emotions are not
hard-wired, innate entities and therefore, physiological changes cannot differentiate between
manipulated emotional states. Indeed, the evidence for emotion-specific patterns is equivo-
cal (for a review see Barrett, 2006). However, other scholars disagree with this conclusion
and point at various limitations of previous research (Kragel & LaBar, 2013). Most notably,
researchers preferably applied univariate tests comparing a set of emotions with respect to a
multitude of physiological parameters. Yet, it is unlikely that single parameters individually
relate to distinct emotions. Actually, when patterns of parameters are used to predict emo-
tion categories, correct classifications increase significantly. As a compromise between these
two extreme stances, others argue that physiological changes are more consistently related to
certain dimensions underlying every emotional experience: valence and arousal (Bradley &
Lang, 2000; Mauss & Robinson, 2009). In response to new stimuli, the heart rate initially
decelerates, then accelerates, and finally decelerates again. Positive stimuli increase acceler-
ation, whereas negative stimuli increase initial deceleration. Furthermore, emotional arousal
leads to corresponding increases in skin conductance and stronger as well as more sustained
cortical activity between 400 and 700ms after stimulus onset independent of valence. These
physiological changes are interpreted as motivational inclinations of approach and avoidance
(mainly driven by valence) and respective intensity of motivational striving (mainly driven
by arousal) that prepare an individual to adaptively deal with an emotion-inducing situation
(Bradley & Lang, 2000).
How can this be applied to envy? Chapter 2 relates benign envy to hope for success (ap-
proach orientation) and malicious envy to fear of failure (avoidance orientation). Specifically,
although both envy forms are generally negative and frustrating, benignly envious individuals
are probably focused more on the positively evaluated envy object and how to approach it,
whereas maliciously envious individuals are probably focused more on the negatively evalu-
ated person and how to avoid falling short of this person’s standard (Crusius & Lange, 2014).
Therefore, benign envy most likely also fosters some positive emotions, whereas malicious
envy might be uniformly negative. Furthermore, I would argue that benign envy constitutes
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a long-term strategy in which self-improvement motivation is mainly implemented once the
situational prerequisites to act on the goal occur. For instance, although comparisons with
competitors during training will immediately elicit self-improvement motivation in marathon
runners, the strongest boost would be functional during the race. In contrast, malicious envy
constitutes a short-term strategy in which the envier should instantly act on the avoidance goal
to protect once self-esteem. As the intensity of immediate motivational striving is related to
arousal, benign envy should relate to lower arousal than malicious envy. In sum, benign envy
might entail stronger heart rate acceleration, lower initial heart rate deceleration, lower skin
conductance, and lower as well as less sustained cortical positivity than malicious envy.
If future research reveals characteristic physiological patterns of the envy forms, such ev-
idence would also contradict the constructionist approach (Barrett, 2014). In particular, this
approach predicts that physiological changes are randomly distributed over different emotions
and are aligned by labeling a specific affective state (Lindquist et al., 2015). As envy is only
hardly admitted privately and publicly (Smith & Kim, 2007), labeling processes should be
unable to explain a systematic coordination of different physiological parameters. This is an
important advantage over other emotions with respect to this research question. People rarely
hide their surprise or fear. Therefore, a spontaneous labeling process can always explain char-
acteristic physiological patterns for more basic emotions (as for instance in Kragel & LaBar,
2013) and it becomes impossible to falsify the constructionist approach. This alternative ex-
planation is absent in envy research. Thus, studying envy’s physiological changes constitutes
a strong test of the emotion syndrome view in general.
The second component that I neglected is the expressive component (see Roseman, 2013).
Emotions are expressed and perceived via many different channels. Most centrally, emo-
tions are expressed and perceived through facial expressions (Shariff & Tracy, 2011), postu-
ral changes (Aviezer, Trope, & Todorov, 2012a), and vocal cues (Banse & Scherer, 1996).
Although, all these cues are probably integrated into a holistic percept of the person (see
for instance Aviezer, Trope, & Todorov, 2012b), scholars overwhelmingly investigated these
channels individually. As mentioned above, many emotions actually lack a clear expressive
component (Ekman, 1993). In addition, people often experience an emotion but suppress its
expression as a means to regulate it (Gross, 2015). For an envier, it might even be disadvanta-
geous to express the emotion as admitting envy reveals low status and norm-deviating feelings
(Silver & Sabini, 1978). It is therefore challenging to derive precise predictions with respect
to distinct facial, postural, or vocal cues differentiating between benign and malicious envy.
However, in light of the current conceptualization of envy I can derive some directions for
future research.
As far as I know, there are no documented facial and postural manifestations of envy. Yet,
this is not to say that enviers never display any signs in the face or body that could reveal
their emotion. In general, as both envy forms relate to equal levels of frustration, they might
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increase activation of an unspecific facial cue indicating negative valence—the corrugator su-
percilii (Larsen, Norris, & Cacioppo, 2003). Furthermore, I propose that certain facial and
postural cues could help to perceive either benign or malicious envy. This proposition is based
on two empirical observations. First, we recently collected evidence showing that disposi-
tional benign and malicious envy inclinations mediated the paradoxial effects of grandiose
narcissism on peer ratings (Lange et al., 2015). We theorized that benign and malicious envy
could foster observable behavior which then informs the peer ratings. Second, self and peer
ratings of benign and malicious envy were moderately correlated with each other especially
in close relationships (Lange & Hagemeyer, 2015). This suggests that observers know how
envious their close friends are.
How exactly might benign and malicious envy manifest in observable behavior? I argue
that contextual information should be vital as such information often has a strong influence
on emotion perception (e.g., Barrett & Kensinger, 2010). Anecdotal evidence suggests that
people easily infer envy from pictures in which an advantaged person (e.g., with a nice lolly)
is accompanied by a frustrated, disadvantaged person (e.g., without a nice lollipop). People
also attribute certain behaviors of others to envy, for instance by stating „You are just envi-
ous“ when these others talk badly about their recent successes. This suggest that it might
be feasible to infer envy based on the full contextual information—the triad of envier, envied
person, and envy object. If an observer discloses their affective connections, envy could be
perceived. In particular, I predict that eye movements determine whether perceivers infer be-
nign or malicious envy. Crucially, envy is strongly linked to the eye. Already the Latin word
from which envy was derived—invidere—means to look upon and in several cultures people
fear the evil eye of their competitors (Foster, 1972), implying that observers may focus on
eye movements to infer envy. As alluded to above, this anecdotal evidence also extends to
attentional processes as benign envy relates to a focus on means to reach the upward goal and
malicious envy to a focus on the envied person (Crusius & Lange, 2014). Collectively, this
suggests that when the envier looks at or is mentally mostly concerned with the envy object,
observers should infer benign envy. In contrast, when the envier looks at or is mentally mostly
concerned with the envied person, observers should infer malicious envy. Thus, I predict that
contextual information—the envy object and the envied person—jointly with eye movements
to either of them provide observers with the necessary information to infer benign or malicious
envy in enviers, respectively.
Moreover, the extant research on vocal expressions of emotions also enables future re-
search to investigate vocal patterns for benign and malicious envy. Indeed, when vocal pa-
rameters are manipulated or measured (Banse & Scherer, 1996; Scherer & Oshinsky, 1977),
observers can infer distinct emotions with comparable accuracy to inferences based on facial
expressions (for a review see Scherer, 2003). As with facial and postural cues, there is no
research with respect to vocal patterns of benign and malicious envy. However, there are at
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least two separate lines of previous research from which one can derive (partly contradicting)
predictions: the links of emotional arousal and status differences with vocal expressions. First,
Bachorowski and colleagues (Bachorowski, 1999; Bachorowski & Owren, 1995) revealed that
emotional arousal increases mean pitch (fundamental frequency of speech), pitch variability,
and vocal amplitude. This pattern is also consistently found for a multitude of arousing emo-
tions (Scherer, 2003). As alluded to above, I argue that benign envy is less arousing than
malicious envy, speaking to lower pitch, pitch variability and vocal amplitude in the former.
Research on status and vocal patterns demonstrates that highly ranked individuals speak with
higher mean pitch and that perceived mean pitch leads to higher inferred rank (Ko, Sadler,
& Galinsky, 2015). As I propose that malicious envy’s function corresponds to a short-term
strategy, it should lead to instant efforts to communicate high status to observers. In contrast,
for benign envy to be functional, the envier first has to improve personal performance—a
long-term strategy. Therefore, instant status communication is unlikely. Thus, malicious envy
should lead to higher pitch, dovetailing with the arousal findings. In contrast to this prediction,
Chapter 3 implies that malicious envy fosters the pursuit of dominance, a status form which
provokes and is perceived through decreased pitch (Cheng, 2013). In my opinion, these op-
posing predictions for the effect of malicious envy on pitch (either increasing or decreasing
pitch) might emerge as a result of two separate functions of emotional expressions (see Shariff
& Tracy, 2011). On the one hand, emotion expressions evolved to provide benefits for the
emotional person. For instance, a disgust facial expression prevents toxic chemicals to enter
the body (Rozin & Fallon, 1987). On the other hand, emotion expressions also evolved as a
means to communicate information to others and were therefore intentionally intensified. For
instance, pride displays communicate status (Shariff & Tracy, 2009) and are often displayed
in an exaggerated manner after success (Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008). For envy, differences
in arousal likely relate to the first function as they constitute immediate reactions preparing
the individual to deal with lower status by spurring approach or avoidance (Bradley & Lang,
2000) given dispositional (Chapter 2) and situational (Chapter 3) determinants. In contrast,
when malicious envy leads to the pursuit of dominance, the communication thereof probably
corresponds to the second function of emotional expressions. This could be so as the envier
obviously is not dominant in an envy situation but would need to imply such an inference in
others to immediately overcome the status difference. In fact, vocal cues are prone to inten-
tional changes by individuals (Bachorowski, 1999), speaking to the likelihood of using it as a
deliberate signal to observer. Future research should test the dissociation of the two functions
of envy by disentangling their (un)intentional facets.
Second, aside from changes in specific vocal parameters, status also relates to broader lin-
guistic styles. If envy is a social-functional response to status differences, with the goal to
increase personal standing (either by improving own status or harming competitors’ status),
then these findings will allow to predict expressive components of envy. Specifically, presti-
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gious individuals express higher confidence (Anderson, Brion, Moore, & Kennedy, 2012) and
use a socially attractive verbal style characterized by, for instance, seeking approval, appear-
ing self-deprecating, and being humorous (Cheng, 2013). In contrast, dominant individuals
speak more frequently, contribute to conversations early on (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009), and
use an intimidating verbal style characterized, for instance, by appearing overbearing, humil-
iating others, and forcefully pushing one’s ideas (Cheng, 2013). It would be interesting to
study whether the desires for prestige and dominance underlying benign and malicious envy
(Chapter 3) could shape envier’s linguistic styles in these directions.
Finally, I propose that the general approach underlying the current conceptualization of
envy is also a vital starting point for other emotional states. As repeatedly alluded to above,
conceptualizing an emotion as a syndrome in which appraisal dimensions coordinate various
components is very parsimonious. Because several determinants of the appraisal dimensions
constitute elicitors of the emotion, the incorporation of various specific determinants becomes
unnecessary. Applying this framework, researchers will be able to explain seemingly distinct
outcomes of emotions as the result of coordinated, functional strategies driven by general cog-
nition. An emotion for which such conceptual work might be fruitful is nostalgia. Nostalgia
is a bittersweet emotion in which individuals long for positive aspects of their past (for a re-
view see Sedikides et al., 2015). Research attests that it is triggered by relatively innocuous
stimuli (e.g., songs, smells) or distressing situations (e.g., social exclusion, loneliness, existen-
tial terror) and serves various seemingly unrelated functions. On the affective side, nostalgia
increases the positivity of the self-concept and the personal future. On the cognitive side,
nostalgia fosters perceived meaning in life, felt social connectedness, and empathic skills. On
the motivational side, nostalgia spurs prosocial action tendencies and general approach orien-
tation. Sedikides and colleagues (2015) proposed a model in which threatening situations of
various kinds simultaneously evoke negative effects and nostalgia. The latter then dampens
the former—a striving for homeostasis. Apparently, the many functions of nostalgia are dis-
tributed over a broad range of positive outcomes in a rather unstructured manner. To address
this limitation, Baldwin, Biernat, and Landau (2015) recently theorized and demonstrated that
nostalgia can increase access to the intrinsic self—an authentic self that describes who one
truly is—which unifies nostalgia’s diverse consequences. Complementing these efforts, I sug-
gest that research on nostalgia would also benefit from a theory-driven conceptualization of its
elicitation. Which appraisal dimensions mediate the elicitation of nostalgia and might there-
fore trigger access to the intrinsic self and coordinate the resulting affective, cognitive, and
motivational components? Applying the approach detailed in this dissertation may structure
the complex field of nostalgia research and open up new avenues for future research.
In comparison to the most relevant control condition—happiness—I predict that nostal-
gia is elicited by appraisals of low novelty, low intrinsic pleasantness, high goal significance
(urgency of goal implementation), and low compatibility with internal standards (based on
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the appraisal theory outlined in Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). Furthermore, it should be as
high as happiness on adjustment (emotion-focused coping potential). Novelty appraisals re-
late to new and unexpected environmental stimuli that deserve further attention. As nostalgia
is elicited in response to familiar stimuli from the past (e.g., songs from one’s childhood)
and fulfills a homeostatic function for ongoing threatening conditions (e.g., death anxiety,
meaninglessness)—implying distraction from threats and not increased attention to them—it
should be linked to low novelty. Furthermore, the bittersweet nature of nostalgia and its re-
lation to existential or social threat should lower its intrinsic pleasantness and increase the
urgency to act. When nostalgia then buffers the threat, the person must have perceived the
situation as adjustable via emotion-focused coping in order to eventually reach the personal
standard of the intrinsic self. These different appraisal dimension probably relate to differ-
ent outcomes of nostalgia (as described in Baldwin et al., 2015; Sedikides et al., 2015). For
instance, the adjustment appraisal might correlate with the affective and cognitive compo-
nents. When the nostalgic person experiences high emotion-focused coping potential, this
might trigger strategies to mitigate the threatening condition such as increases in perceived
self-concept positivity and meaning in life. Furthermore, appraisals of low compatibility with
internal standards might activate efforts to reestablish the intrinsic self and therefore trigger
approach motivation. This would imply that a nostalgic individual compares the current self to
the authentic past self, a discrepancy that activates assimilative action. In fact, recent evidence
supports that addicts’ nostalgic feelings towards their pre-addicted selfs increases behavioral
change (Kim & Wohl, 2015). Finally, the appraisal of high urgency could link nostalgia to
an inclination of persistent motivational striving, a hypothesis still awaiting empirical testing.
Thus, applying an emotion syndrome approach as conceptualized here for envy to nostalgia
might structure and extend this research domain.
4.2 Conclusion
Envy’s stigma of being a vicious sin is about to change. Instead, the current evidence sup-
ports a conceptualization of envy as a social-functional emotion syndrome. Consequently, a
new picture of envy emerges that points at adaptive benefits of the most joyless of all sins. Ac-
cordingly, envy is not felt by ill-minded individuals and fostered by unjust situational charac-
teristics but systematically determined by dispositional and situational moderators that affect
appraisals of personal control and deservingness, linking envy to diverse functional affective,
cognitive, and motivational outcomes. This approach addresses various limitations of previ-
ous conceptualizations of envy, allows to derive a multitude of predictions concerning other
components of envious responding, and informs emotion research in general. Thus, Henry
Fielding and William Petty were misguided, great souls can feel envy and this might not be
burdensome for the world.
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6. Appendix
6.1 Appendix A
Confirmatory factor analysis.
Participants. We collapsed five independent samples including the samples from Study
2.2 (Sample 4) and Study 2.3 (Sample 5) in which we used the BeMaS. Details regarding the
origins of the samples, their composition regarding age and gender as well as details on the
reliability of the dispositional benign and malicious subscales can be found in Table A1.
Table A1. Demographic Data of Participants of the Confirmatory Factor Analysis and De-
scriptive Statistics of the BeMaS.
Benign Envya Malicious Envya
Sample N Mage n(male) α M (SD) α M (SD)
1 MTurk 218 35.43 79 .88 3.96 (1.10) .88 2.50 (1.12)
2 German Students 134 26.16 43 .85 3.81 (0.98) .84 2.40 (0.93)
3 MTurk 195 36.23 80 .90 4.00 (1.18) .88 2.27 (1.09)
4 MTurk 194 31.18 129 .89 4.12 (1.10) .91 2.53 (1.18)
5 MTurk 192 31.60 121 .84 4.12 (0.92) .90 2.54 (1.13)
a Participants responded on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).
Materials and procedure. In each sample, participants filled in the BeMaS next to other
scales unrelated to the current analysis.
Results and discussion. A model with two correlated factors—dispositional benign and
malicious envy—showed good fit to the data, χ2(34) = 189.89, p < .001, GFI = .96,CFI =
.97, AGFI = .93, and RMSEA = .07 CI95%[.06; .08]. The standardized regression weights
for each item were > .63. Both factors were correlated, r(933) = .15, p < .001. Impor-
tantly, an alternative model with one trait envy factor on which all items loaded produced very
poor fit, χ2(35) = 2662.85, p < .001, GFI = .55,CFI = .47, AGFI = .29, and RMSEA= .28
CI95%[.27; .29]. This corroborates the structural stability of the BeMaS especially in compar-
ison to a conception of envy as a unitary factor.
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Temporal stability.
Participants. The temporal stability of the BeMaS was tested with Sample 3 from the con-
firmatory factor analysis (see Table A1). The final sample included 174 participants amounting
to a response rate of 89%.
Materials and procedure. Three to four weeks after participants had completed the scale,
we invited them to complete the BeMaS again.
Results and discussion. The temporal stabilities of the dispositional benign envy subscale,
r(174) = .67, p< .001, and the dispositional malicious envy subscale, r(174) = .66, p< .001,
were both acceptable. This corroborates the quality of the BeMaS and speaks to the disposi-
tional nature of benign and malicious envy.
Structural equation model Study 2.4.
We tested a complete model with the data of Study 2.4. In the model, dispositional benign
and malicious envy served as parallel predictor variables. We specified indirect effects of
the envy forms via race goal to race speed. Variance in race goal and race speed already
explained by age, gender, and race type were controlled. In addition, the envy forms and the
covariates were all allowed to correlate. The model showed excellent fit, χ2(2) = 1.15, p =
.56, GFI = 1.00, AGFI = 0.99,CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .000 CI95%[.000; .088] (see Figure
A1). The indirect effect for dispositional benign envy via race goal on race speed with 5000
bootstrap re-samples and bias-corrected confidence interval (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) was
significant, ab = 0.16, CI95%[0.04;0.28]. The excellent model fit implies that this constitutes
a full mediation. Also as expected, the indirect effect of dispositional malicious envy was not
significant, ab =−0.09, CI95%[−0.27;0.09].
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Dispositional
Benign Envy
Race Speed
in km/h
Race Goal
in km/h
.13*
.82*
Dispositional
Malicious Envy
-.06
.15*
Age
Gender
Race Type
-.03
-.33*
-.07
-.04
-.10*
-.05+
-.22*
.09
-.01
-.13*
.02
-.04
Figure A1. Indirect effects of dispositional benign and malicious envy via race goal on race
speed controlling for age, gender, and race type. Gender was coded 0 — Male, 1 — Female.
Race Type was coded 0 — Half Marathon, 1 — Full Marathon. ∗p < .05. +p < .10.
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6.2 Appendix B
Table B1. Items Measuring Benign Envy, Malicious Envy, Intensity of Negative Affect, and
Deservingness in Study 3.1.
Scale Items
Benign Envy I tried harder to also obtain X.
I felt inspired to also obtain X.
I wished to also have X.
I desired X.
I admired the Person.
I liked the Person.
I wanted to be like the Person.
Malicious Envy I felt coldness towards the Person.
I wished that the Person would fail at something.
I would have liked to damage X.
I would have liked to hurt the Person.
I wished that the Person would no longer have X.
I would have liked to take X away from the Person.
I had negative thoughts about the Person.
Intensity of Negative Affect It hurt not to have X.
That the Person had X and I lacked it elicited strong nega-
tive feelings in me.
It felt frustrating that I did not have X.
Deservingness The Person didn’t deserve X. (r)
It felt undeserved that the Person had X and I hadn’t. (r)
That the Person was in possession of X felt unfair. (r)
Note. Person refers to the envied person. X refers to the envied person’s advantage. Items marked with an r are reversed coded. Answers
were given on scales from 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (applies very much).
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Table B2. Correlations of all Measures in Study 3.1.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Benign Envya —
2 Malicious Envya -.29* —
3 Intensity of Negative Affecta .25* .36* —
4 Deservingnessa .33* -.71* -.40* —
5 Pride Occurrenceb -.03 -.07 -.09 .05 —
6 Authentic Pridec .14 -.08 .19* .09 -.18* —
7 Hubristic Pridec -.23* .63* .22* -.50* -.19* .08 —
Note. N = 122. Spearman Correlations.
a Answers were given on a scale from 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (applies very much).
b Did you notice or hear of any occurrence of pride on the side of the person you envied in relation to his/her advantage? 1 — yes, 2 — no
c Answers were given on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely).
∗p < .05
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Table B3. Correlations of all Measures in Study 3.2.
1 2 3
1 General Envy —
2 Benign Envy .27* —
3 Malicious Envy .44* .18* —
Note. N = 120. Spearman Correlations.
Answers were given on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).
∗p < .05
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Table B4. Items Measuring Benign Envy, Malicious Envy, and Intensity of Negative Affect in
Study 3.3.
Scale Items
Benign Envy Ich strenge mich mehr an, um in der nächsten Klausur eben-
falls eine gute Note zu bekommen. (I try harder to also obtain
a good grade in the next exam.)
Tina/Tim inspiriert mich dazu, in der nächsten Klausur eben-
falls eine gute Note zu bekommen. (Tina/Tim inspires me to
also obtain a good grade in the next exam.)
Tina/Tim motiviert mich dazu ihr nachzueifern. (Tina/Tim mo-
tivates me to emulate her/him.)
Tinas/Tims Erfolg ermutigt mich. (Tina’s/Tim’s success en-
courages me.)
Ich möchte wie Tina/Tim sein. (I want to be like Tina/Tim.)
Malicious Envy Ich wünsche mir, dass Tina/Tim bei einer anderen Sache
scheitert. (I wish that Tina/Tim would fail at something.)
Ich würde gerne über Tina/Tim lästern. (I would like to gossip
about Tina/Tim.)
Ich würde Tina/Tim gerne weh tun. (I would like to hurt
Tina/Tim.)
Ich wünsche mir, dass Tina/Tim die gute Note nicht mehr hat.
(I wish that Tina/Tim would no longer have a good grade.)
Ich würde Tina/Tim die gute Note gerne wegnehmen. (I would
like to take the good grade away from Tina/Tim.)
Intensity of Negative Affect Es tut weh nicht so eine gute Note zu haben. (It hurts not to
have a good grade.)
Dass Tina/Tim so eine gute Note hat und ich nicht verursacht
starke negative Gefühle in mir. (That Hillary/Joe has a good
grade and I lack it, elicits strong negative feelings in me.)
Es ist frustrierend, dass ich nicht so eine gute Note habe. (It
feels frustrating that I do not have a good grade.)
Note. Original items were in German. In parentheses are English translations. Answers were given on scales from 1 (does not apply at all)
to 7 (applies very much).
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Table B5. Correlations of all Measures in Study 3.3.
1 2 3
1 Benign Envy —
2 Malicious Envy -.15* —
3 Intensity of Negative Affect .14* .44* —
Note. N = 301.
Answers were given on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).
∗p < .05
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Table B6. Items Measuring Benign Envy, Malicious Envy, and Intensity of Negative Affect in
Study 3.4.
Scale Items
Benign Envy I try harder to also obtain a good grade in the next exam.
Hillary/Joe inspires me to also obtain a good grade in the
next exam.
I wish to also have a good grade.
Hillary’s/Joe’s success encourages me.
I want to be like Hillary/Joe.
Malicious Envy I wish that Hillary/Joe would fail at something.
I would like to gossip about Hillary/Joe.
I would like to hurt Hillary/Joe.
I wish that Hillary/Joe would no longer have a good grade.
I would like to take the good grade away from Hillary/Joe.
Intensity of Negative Affect It hurts not to have a good grade.
That Hillary/Joe has a good grade and I lack it, elicits strong
negative feelings in me.
It feels frustrating that I do not have a good grade.
Note. Answers were given on scales from 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (applies very much).
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Table B7. Correlations of all Measures in Study 3.4.
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Benign Envy —
2 Malicious Envy -.32* —
3 Liking .50* -.51* —
4 Prestige .61* -.33* .51* —
5 Dominance -.35* .47* -.57* -.38* —
6 Intensity of Negative Affect .13* .38* -.35* .03 .26* —
Note. N = 397.
Answers were given on scales from 1 to 7.
∗p < .05
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Items measuring envy in Study 3.5. Items marked with an r are reversed coded. Answers
were given on a scale from 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (applies very much).
1) Hillary/Joe inspires me to also obtain a good grade in the next exam.
2) I desire a good grade.
3) I wish that Hillary/Joe would fail at something. (r)
4) I want to be like Hillary/Joe.
5) I wish that Hillary/Joe would no longer have a good grade. (r)
6) I would like to take the good grade away from Hillary/Joe. (r)
7) Hillary/Joe doesn’t deserve a good grade. (r)
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Table B8. Correlations of Central Measures in Study 3.6.
1 2 3 4 5
1 Authentic Pride Alex14a —
2 Hubristic Pride Alex 14a -.19* —
3 Envious Selfa .06 .07 —
4 Set Difficultyb -.22* .41* .16* —
5 Persistencec .10 .09 .01 -.04 —
Note. N = 187. Spearman Correlations. One missing value for Envious Self.
a Answers were given on a scale from 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 (applies very much).
b Values vary from 8 (easy) to 24 (very difficulty).
c Measured in seconds. Values vary from 0 to 420.
∗p < .05
